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Magical Thinking and Trusts 
Bridget J. Crawford * 
At a time of monumental economic inequality in the United States, 
wealthy individuals and their tax-motivated behavior have come under 
significant scrutiny from all corners.  In 2019, the Supreme Court issued its 
first major ruling in over sixty years on the state income taxation of trusts.  
In North Carolina Department of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 
1992 Family Trust, the Court declined to close what some critics consider 
to be a major loophole that benefits the trusts that wealthy individuals 
create for family members.  This Article makes two principal claims—one 
interpretative and the other normative.  This Article explains why the 
Court’s decision in Kaestner Trust is correct as a matter of law.  Just as 
trusts themselves are a type of magical thinking—legal fictions made real 
by law—so, too, is the hope that the judicial branch can play an active role 
in limiting the use of trusts by the wealthy.  Because judges cannot 
disregard centuries of trust jurisprudence, critics of family trusts instead 
have directed their attention mostly to the tax law.  This Article suggests 
that reformation of the substantive law of trusts might help achieve reform, 
as well. 
Through the prism of a reimagined legal landscape for trusts—by 
engaging in a different exercise in magical thinking—one can differentiate 
those aspects of family trusts that serve salutary legal or social purposes 
from those that serve primarily to preserve and protect wealth.  This 
analysis has important implications for the larger cultural conversation 
about trusts.  Examining how trusts operate and considering what 
limitations, if any, a just society might impose on them opens the way for 
identifying allies in the effort to narrow the wealth gap.  Reducing wealth 
inequality is crucial so that all people will have some means of pursuing 
their personal ideals of social, political, and economic fulfillment. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Dragons and magic beans are the stuff of fiction, not law.1  Impartial 
jurors are fictional, too, because no person can be literally free from bias or 
opinion.2  But the U.S. Constitution requires an impartial jury, so the law 
tolerates a certain degree of wishful belief that such a thing exists.3  
Similarly a corporation is an imagined entity.4  It has no corporeal presence 
 
 1  See, e.g., J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE GOBLET OF FIRE (2000) (in which 
the story’s title character must fight a fire-breathing, flying dragon in an inter-school 
competition); JACK AND THE BEANSTALK (retold by Carol Ottolenghi, Carson Dellosa 
Publishing 2002), https://tinyurl.com/y3grctq8 (in which Jack sells family cow for magic 
beans). 
 2  The court system operates on the presumption that it is possible to seat an impartial 
jury, even though cognitive bias is endemic to the human condition.  As one scholar 
describes it, “an impartial juror is not a completely neutral person, but is one who evidences 
no extreme bias for or against the accused.”  Tony M. Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?—
Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine, Images, and Procedures, 64 N.C. L. REV. 501, 544 
(1986) (discussing cognitive bias in the context of jury selection and the Sixth Amendment 
right to an “impartial jury”).  
 3  U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation . . . .”).  
 4  Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 
1638–39 (2011) (“the notion of legal personality is consistent with early case law such 
as . . .  that recognized corporations as legal fictions having the capacities and characteristics 
given to them in the corporate charter, such as “individuality”) (citations omitted).  
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and owes its existence to shareholders—yet the law treats a corporation as 
a “person,” bestowing on it the ability to contract, sue, make political and 
charitable donations, and even exercise rights of political free speech.5 
Like unbiased jurors and corporations, trusts are legal fictions made 
real by the law.6  For hundreds of years7 the common law has recognized 
the right of a property owner (typically known as the “grantor” or “settlor”) 
to transfer property to a trustee, to hold and manage the property for the 
benefit of others.  In the classic private express trust context, the law treats 
the trustee as the legal owner of the property and the beneficiary (or 
beneficiaries) as the equitable owner(s) of the property.8  The beneficiary 
 
 5  See, e.g., id. at 1638 (historically corporations were permitted “to contract, own 
property, sue and be sued in the corporate name.  Specifically, the corporate ability to own 
property and to sue and be sued were considered incident to the corporate form at common 
law”) (citations omitted).  See also 26 U.S.C. § 170(a) (2018) (income tax deduction for 
charitable contributions); Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Power of Corporation to Make 
Political Contribution or Expenditure Under State Law, 79 A.L.R.3d 491 (discussing 
general power of corporation to make contributions for certain political purposes).  In 2010, 
the Supreme Court ruled that corporations have constitutional protection for their “political 
speech.”  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010) (“[P]olitical 
speech does not lose First Amendment protection ‘simply because its source is a 
corporation.”) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978)).  
See also Robert Sprague & Mary Ellen Wells, The Supreme Court as Prometheus: 
Breathing Life into the Corporate Supercitizen, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 507, 556 (2012) (tracing 
development of American law of corporations, including with regard to political speech 
rights).  
 6  Related to, or perhaps a branch of, legal fiction are legal presumptions.  For a 
somewhat light-hearted look at evidentiary presumptions in South Carolina law, for 
example, see Walter Moïse, Bursting Bubbles, Legal Fictions and Evidential Presumptions, 
27 S.C. LAW. 16, 17 (2015) (listing presumptions such as “persons are conclusively 
presumed to know the law, which includes statutes and common law;” “when a bigamous 
spouse enters marriage in good faith, his or her children are conclusively presumed to be 
legitimate;” and “a person is presumed to know and intend the probable and natural 
consequences of his or her actions”) (citing ALEX SANDERS & JOHN S. NICHOLS, TRIAL 
HANDBOOK FOR SOUTH CAROLINA LAWYERS: PRESUMPTIONS § 12 (2018)). 
 7  Depending on the origin story one prefers, the modern day private express trust has a 
different ancestor.  See, e.g., ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS & 
ESTATES 386 (10th ed. 2017) (“Because the [Franciscan] friars [in England] were forbidden 
to own property, benefactors conveyed land to friends of the friars, to hold to the use of the 
friars,” and thus the use—a precursor to the modern trust—was known in thirteenth century 
England.).  See also JOSHUA PRAWER, THE LATIN KINGDOM OF JERUSALEM 211 (1972) 
(suggesting that Christian contact with Muslims during the Crusades was an inspiration for 
the English trust); Avisheh Avini, Comment, The Origins of the Modern English Trust 
Revisited, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1139, 1139 (1996) (identifying Crusades as likely point of 
contact by Englishmen with Muslims and the Islamic legal system that recognized a trust-
like device known as a waqf); Shael Herman, Note, Utilitas Ecclesiae: The Canonical 
Conception of the Trust, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2239, 2278 (1996) (describing the Islamic waqf as 
an influence on the modern trust).  For an overview of the general structure of trusts see, 
e.g., SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER supra, at 401 (detailing how grantors create trusts).  
 8  See SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER supra note 7, at 401. But see Johanna Jacques, Property 
and the Interests of Things: The Case of the Donative Trust, 30 L. & CRITIQUE 201, 202–03 
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may or may not have a right to receive income or principal (or both) from 
the trust.9  A beneficiary’s creditors ordinarily cannot reach the 
beneficiary’s interest in the trust, as long as the instrument is drafted 
carefully.10  The law typically does not treat the beneficiary as the “owner” 
of the trust property for tax purposes, either, as long as the property stays in 
the trust and the beneficiary does not have any right to control or obtain 
it.11  These legal fictions—trusts—have the force of law because the law 
converts magical thinking into material reality, with duties for the trustee 
and corresponding rights of beneficiaries.12 
From the introduction of trusts in thirteenth-century England, trusts 
have always intertwined with tax avoidance.13  That entanglement has 
continued unabated into the twenty-first century.14  At a time when wealth 
inequality in the United States is at staggering levels—and only 
increasing—critics are drawing attention to the use (and misuse) by 
wealthy individuals of private express trusts intended as alternatives to 
 
(2019) (critiquing in context of “the kind of private donative trust that is commonly 
regarded as an alternative to an outright gift” the liberal conception of property as 
necessarily involving control by one or more individuals). 
 9  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TRUSTS § 49 (AM. LAW. INST. 2019) (describing 
multiple possible configurations of beneficial interests).   
 10  See id. at § 60 (Transfer or Attachment of Discretionary Interest). 
 11  But see, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 2041(a) (2018) (estate tax inclusion of property over 
which beneficiary has general power of appointment); 2056(b)(5) (estate tax inclusion of 
trust in which spouse beneficiary had life estate with power of appointment).  See also 
Robert T. Danforth, A Proposal for Integrating the Income and Transfer Taxation of Trusts, 
18 VA. TAX REV. 545 (1999) (providing an overview of relationship between income 
taxation of trusts and the wealth transfer tax system); Joseph M. Dodge, Simplifying Models 
for the Income Taxation of Trusts and Estates, 14 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 127, 137–42 (1997) 
(describing general structure of income tax rules applicable to trusts). 
 12  See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 801 (trustee’s duty to administer trust), 802 (trustee’s 
duty of loyalty), 803 (trustee’s duty of impartiality), 804 (trustee’s duty of prudent 
administration), 813 (right of beneficiaries to receive certain information about the trust), 
1002 (right of beneficiary to receive damages for breach of trust) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
2000).  See also David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisions 
and Policy Issues, 67 MO. L. REV. 143 (2002). 
 13  See, e.g., Bridget J. Crawford, Less Trust Means More Trusts, 75 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. ONLINE 74, 79–80 (2019) (describing trusts as way of avoiding feudal incidents or 
restrictions on property ownership by certain groups or individuals). 
 14  See, e.g., Alyssa A. DiRusso, Pro and Con (Law): Considering the Irrevocable 
Nongrantor Trust Technique, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1999, 2003–05 (2014) (critiquing use of 
incomplete nongrantor trusts as “tax tricks” that obscure “how dying people want to leave 
things behind”); Grayson M.P. McCouch, Who Killed the Rule Against Perpetuities?, 40 
PEPP. L. REV. 1291, 1297–99 (2013) (describing use of long-term trusts as way of 
minimizing or avoiding generation skipping transfer tax); Jeffrey Schoenblum & Neil 
Schoenblum, Avoid State Income Tax with the Right Kind of Trusts, 41 EST. PLAN. 19 (2014) 
(outlining multiple strategies to allow resident of states with high income tax rates to 
minimize tax burden on investment assets). 
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outright gifts.15  Because the beneficiaries of these trusts typically are 
related to the grantor, this Article refers to these trusts as “family trusts,” 
and limits its discussion to them. 
Critics of family trusts bemoan the relative ease with which wealthy 
taxpayers can put money in family trusts and avoid further taxation 
entirely.16  Some hoped and expected that the Supreme Court would put an 
end to perceived abusive income tax avoidance with a decision in North 
Carolina Department of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family 
Trust.17  Contrary to critics’ hopes, however, a unanimous Court ruled in 
June, 2019 that a state may not tax a trust solely on the basis of a 
beneficiary’s in-state residence.18  Where that beneficiary does not receive 
any income from the trust, has no right to demand property from the trust, 
has no right to participate in decisions about whether or when the trustee 
makes distributions from the trust, and is not certain to receive property 
from the trust, imposing income tax on the trust violates the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.19  Justice Alito, joined by Justice 
Roberts and Justice Gorsuch, emphasized in a concurrence that “the Court 
merely applies our existing precedent,” and that the Court’s failure to 
consider questions absent from the Kaestner Trust case is not an invitation 
to “open for reconsideration any points resolved by our prior decisions.”20  
Thus it is highly unlikely that, any time in the near future, the Court will 
take another case involving the income taxation of trusts.21 
 
 15  See infra Part IV. 
 16  See infra Part IV. 
 17  N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr., 139 S. Ct. 2213 
(2019).  Kaestner Trust is the most important decision regarding trusts and income taxation 
in over sixty years.  Prior to that, the most important Supreme Court case involving the 
ability of a state to impose a tax on a trust was Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).  In 
Hanson, a Pennsylvania resident created a trust with a Delaware trustee.  The trust grantor 
later moved to Florida and changed the beneficiaries of the trust.  One group of purported 
beneficiaries residing in Florida sought to have themselves legally declared as the beneficial 
owners of the trust property.  The Supreme Court held that Florida lacked jurisdiction over 
the Delaware trustee, a necessary party to the Florida proceeding, because the trustee was 
not located in the state, conducted no administrative activity there, and no trust property was 
located in Florida.  Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251.   
 18  Kaestner Trust, 139 S. Ct. at 2224 (“The beneficiaries received no income from the 
Trust, had no right to demand income from the Trust, and had no assurance that they would 
eventually receive a specific share of Trust income.  Given these features of the Trust, the 
beneficiaries’ residence cannot, consistent with due process, serve as the sole basis for 
North Carolina’s tax on trust income.”). 
 19  Id. 
 20  Id. at 2226 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 21  Indeed, shortly after the decision in Kaestner Trust, the Court denied certiorari in 
Minn. Comm’r of Revenue v. William Fielding, a case involving a due process challenge to 
Minnesota’s ability to impose income tax on a trust with assets located in that state.  Minn. 
Comm’r of Revenue v. William Fielding, 916 N.W. 2d 323, 323 (2018) (holding that a trust 
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This Article brings into focus two interrelated strains of magical 
thinking in the law of trusts: the one that gives rise to the existence of trusts 
in the first place; and the other that anticipates that courts will play a 
visible, if not active, role in minimizing the use of trusts by wealthy 
individuals.  Two claims follow.  One is interpretative and the other is 
normative (or perhaps, more accurately, strategic).  This Article explains 
why the Court’s decision in Kaestner Trust is correct as a matter of law and 
argues that centuries of jurisprudence prevent the judicial branch from 
playing a significant role in curbing the use of trusts.  This argument takes 
seriously concerns about wealth inequality.  Dismantling the role that trusts 
play in perpetuating that inequality will require nothing less than a radical 
re-imagining of trust law.  Shaking free of magical thinking clears the way 
for meaningful trust reform.22 
Part II of this Article provides a foundational, factual background 
about wealth inequality in the United States, with a particular emphasis on 
wealth inequality’s racial and gendered dimensions.  It also provides details 
about the known frequency of use and magnitude of holdings by family 
trusts in this country.  Part III explains the Kaestner Trust case and why the 
Court’s decision is consistent with its prior due process jurisprudence.23  
Part IV excavates and evaluates major themes in recent academic critiques 
of family trusts, including express or implied assertions that these trusts are 
mere formalities or sham vehicles subject to de facto control by the 
beneficial owners.24  Part V argues that under existing law, courts are not 
free to disregard trusts (other than those that are egregiously abusive) in the 
 
could not be treated as a “resident trust” and thus was not subject to state income taxation 
where most trust activity occurred outside the state but the trust did hold nonvoting stock 
representing a minority interest in an S corporation doing business in Minnesota other 
states), cert. denied sub nom. Bauerly v. Fielding, 139 S. Ct. 2773 (2019).   
 22  “Magical thinking” is a phrase from anthropology literature that describes non-
rational, non-fact-based thought.  See, e.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF 
THE RELIGIOUS LIFE 26 (Joseph Ward Swain trans., 1969); BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, 
MAGIC, SCIENCE AND RELIGION, AND OTHER ESSAYS 67 (1948); RANDALL STYERS, MAKING 
MAGIC: RELIGION, MAGIC AND SCIENCE IN THE MODERN WORLD 161–62 (2004).  
Sociologists have integrated the term into their field. See, e.g., Eugene Subbotsky, Magical 
Thinking—Reality or Illusion? 6 PSYCHOLOGIST 336, 338 (2004).  Lawyers have not done so 
to a large degree.  But see, e.g., Katya Assaf, Magical Thinking in Trademark Law, 37 LAW 
& SOC. INQUIRY 595, 596 (2012) (“A consistent body of research shows that in modern 
Western societies magical thinking is commonplace.”); Pierre Schlag, Law as the 
Continuation of God by Other Means, 85 CAL. L. REV. 427, 437 (1997) (“The key aspect of 
‘magical thinking’ is the creation of metaphysical entities that make certain worldly events 
come out the way one desires. To engage in magical thinking, one simply posits a thought 
that will make things come out the way one desires and one then affirms that the thought is 
or refers to something that is ontologically real and ontologically effective.”). 
 23  See infra Part III. 
 24  See infra Part IV. 
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service of minimizing wealth inequality.25  Rather, to meaningfully reduce 
wealth inequality, in the absence of major tax reform, state lawmakers 
would have to impose significant limitations on trusts’ permissible 
beneficiaries, duration, maximum asset values and terms.  Part VI briefly 
engages in a magical thinking project of its own, presenting an imagined 
legal system that subjects trusts to one or more of seven invented 
limitations, including radical restrictions on the identities of beneficiaries 
and trustees.26  For a variety of reasons, none of these limitations should be 
adopted in fact.  But identifying potential problems in a fictional legal 
landscape for trusts serves to elevate and focus an ongoing dialogue about 
issues at the intersection of trusts and wealth inequality.27 
II.  WEALTH INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 
A.  The Size and Scope of Wealth Inequality 
Generally speaking, the term “wealth,” as applied to households, 
refers to the net value of all of the assets owned by the people living in that 
household (typically, but not necessarily or exclusively, a group of people 
related by some degree of kinship).28  Assets include stock, bonds, and 
other investments; retirement savings; tangible personal property, and real 
property, like the family home.29  Subtract the individual’s (or family’s) 
debt obligations, and one has a reasonably accurate measure of wealth.30  
 
 25  See infra Part V. 
 26  See infra Part VI. 
 27  See infra Part VI. 
 28  See, e.g., LISA A. KEISTER, WEALTH IN AMERICA: TRENDS IN WEALTH INEQUALITY 6 
(2000) (“Wealth is property; it is the value of the things people own.  Wealth is measured as 
net worth, defined as total assets . . . minus total liabilities . . . .”).  One common-sense 
definition of “wealth” is “non-financial and financial assets over which ownership rights can 
be enforced and that provide economic benefits to their owners.”  Aroop Chatterjee, 
Measuring Wealth Inequality in South Africa: An Agenda 6 (SA-TIED Working Paper No. 
52, 2019), http://sa-tied.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/pdf/SATIED_WP53_Chatterjee_M 
arch_2019.pdf.  “Household” is the common unit of measurement, defined as “a group of 
people occupying a housing unit together,” but excluding group residences like nursing 
homes or dormitories.  Jonathan Eggleston & Robert Munk, Net Worth of Households, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU 2 (Aug. 2018), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/public 
ations/2018/demo/P70BR_155.pdf (defining “household” for purposes of reporting on 
household net worth). 
 29  KEISTER, supra note 28 (noting that net worth is the amount by which the aggregate 
value of all assets “such as stocks, bonds, checking and savings accounts, the value of the 
family home, vacation homes, and other real estate” exceeds total liabilities “such as 
mortgage debt, the balance on credit cards, student loans, and other car loans”). 
 30  Id. (defining wealth as the value of assets minus indebtedness).  See also JOSEPH E. 
STIGLITZ ET AL., REPORT BY THE COMMISSION ON THE MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE AND SOCIAL PROGRESS 33 (2009) (suggesting that measuring material living 
standards requires consideration of “the income, consumption and wealth positions of 
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Wealth differs from income in that income refers to the inflow of money to 
an individual or household, typically from employment (i.e., a salary) or in 
the form of interest or dividends from investments. 31  Income is offset by 
expenses for personal consumption and other maintenance.32 
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, wealth in the United 
States has been concentrated in the hands of the few.33  In 1913, for 
example, the top 0.1% of all households held 22.5% of all national 
wealth.34  By 1928, the same 0.1% owned 24.8% of all wealth.35  After a 
period of decline from 1929 through 1978, wealth inequality began to 
rise.36  By 2012, 0.1% of the population owned 22.0% of all wealth.37  That 
gap in asset ownership between the richest segments of society and the rest 
of the population represents the greatest disparity since the infamous stock 
market crash that led to the Great Depression in 1929.38  In 2016, the top 
0.1% held 19.0% of all wealth.39  The wealth gap continues to increase both 
in the United States and world-wide.40 
 
households or individuals”). 
 31  On the distinction between wealth and income, see, e.g., Palma Joy Strand, 
Inheriting Inequality: Wealth, Race, and the Laws of Succession, 89 OR. L. REV. 453, 458 
(2010) (“Income, generally earned by or assigned to individuals, is the inflow of resources 
over a given time and is often offset to a large degree by outflows to cover expenses.  
Wealth, in contrast, represents accumulated assets and often accrues to families.”).  
 32  Jonathan Fisher et al., Inequality and Mobility Using Income, Consumption and 
Wealth for the Same Individuals, 2 WEALTH INEQUALITY: ECON. & SOC. DIMENSIONS 44, 45 
(2016) (recognizing the distinctions between income, expenditures and wealth, and arguing 
for measuring all three in order to gain an accurate economic picture of the individual or 
household). 
 33  Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 
1913, 131 Q. J. ECON. 519, 521 Figure I (2016) (showing top 0.1% of wealth shares for 
years 1913 through 2012), http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/SaezZucman2016QJEAppendix.pdf 
 34  Id.   
 35  Id. 
 36  Id. (showing top 0.1% of households held varying percentages of aggregate wealth in 
this period, e.g., 16.8% (1938), 10.3% (1948), 9.7% (1958), 10.0% (1968), and 7.1% 
(1978)). 
 37  Id. (showing top 0.1% of households owning 22.0% of all wealth in 2012). 
 38  See Gabriel Zucman, Global Wealth Inequality, 11 ANN. REV. ECON. 109, 120 (2019) 
(“The top 0.1% wealth share peaked at close to 25% in 1929. It then fell abruptly. . . . US 
wealth concentration seems to have returned to levels last seen during the Roaring 
Twenties.”).  See also Andrew Keshner, America’s 1% Hasn’t Had This Much Since Just 
Before the Great Depression, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 24, 2019, 2:45 PM), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/its-been-almost-a-100-years-since-the-americas-1-had-
so-much-wealth-2019-02-11 (reporting that top 10% of all U.S. households held 25% of 
country’s wealth in 1929).  Disparity seems to have peaked in 1910, when the top 1% of 
wealth holders owned approximately 45% of all wealth in 1910.  THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL 
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 439 (2014) (graphically illustrating wealth inequality in the 
United States 1810 to 2010). 
 39  Zucman, supra note 38.  
 40  In 2016, the top one percent held 38.6% of the country’s wealth.  See, e.g., FACUNDA 
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It is possible that the wealth gap is even larger than has been reported.  
According to economist Gabriel Zucman, an estimated four percent of U.S. 
financial wealth is held outside the country, in tax-haven jurisdictions with 
financial secrecy laws that make it difficult to accurately account for these 
assets.41  If his figure is accurate, Zucman explains, then U.S. wealth held 
in non-U.S. jurisdictions causes the government to lose approximately 
thirty-five billion dollars in tax revenue every year, and wealth inequality is 
even more dramatic than many scholars have recognized.42 
Although it is common to talk about wealth inequality by referring to 
two groups—the top 0.1% and all others—the picture becomes even 
bleaker when one considers the top ten percent compared with all others.43  
The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that households in the top 
ten percent have a seventy-five percent wealth share (and an average net 
asset value of $942,000).44  Stated otherwise, the “bottom” ninety percent 
of all households together own just twenty-five percent of the country’s 
wealth.45  If one parses the data even more finely, the “bottom” fifty 
percent holds just one percent of all wealth.46 
 
ALVAREDO ET AL., 2018 WORLD INEQUALITY REPORT 13 (2018), 
https://wir2018.wid.world/files/download/wir2018-summary-english.pdf (illustrating in 
Figure E9 the expected global increase in the share of wealth held by the top 1% of all 
households). 
 41  GABRIEL ZUCMAN, THE HIDDEN WEALTH OF NATIONS: THE SCOURGE OF TAX HAVENS 
34–43 (2015) (explaining his calculation that in 2014, $7.6 trillion in financial assets were 
held in offshore tax-haven jurisdictions, many of which have strict secrecy laws). 
 42  Id. at 53 (estimating $190 billion in global tax revenue lost due to financial assets 
held in offshore tax-haven jurisdictions, with $35 billion attributable to wealth belonging to 
U.S. households). 
 43  See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TRENDS IN FAMILY WEALTH, 1989 TO 2013 5 (2016), 
https://perma.cc/25EP-3AN2 (Exhibit 1: Holdings of Family Wealth, by Wealth Group; 
Exhibit 2: Wealth for Families at Selected Percentiles of the Distribution); CONG. BUDGET 
OFFICE, TRENDS IN FAMILY WEALTH, 1989 TO 2013 SUPPLEMENTAL DATA (2016) (Exhibit 1 
showing top 10% holding 20% of all wealth in 1989 and 51% of all wealth in 2013 and 
Exhibit 2 showing 90% percentile having $942,000 average wealth). 
 44  See TRENDS IN FAMILY WEALTH, 1989 TO 2013, supra note 43 (basing calculations on 
data from the Survey of Consumer Finances to show percentage of wealth owned by top 
10% of all households).  See also The World Top Incomes Database, PARIS SCHOOL OF 
ECONOMICS, http://www.mybudget360.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/wealth-inequality 
.png (last visited Oct. 9, 2019) (fixing percentage at 74%). 
 45  See TRENDS IN FAMILY WEALTH, 1989 TO 2013, supra note 43, at 4 (Exhibit 1) (“In 
2013, families in the top 10% held more than three-quarters of all family wealth, whereas in 
1989, their counterparts had held two-thirds of all family wealth).  According to a more 
recent estimate, the top 10% of all households own 77.1% of all wealth.  See Erin Duffin, 
Wealth Distribution in the United States in 2016, STATISTA (Apr. 29, 2019), 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/203961/wealth-distribution-for-the-us/ (“With such a 
small percentage of people in the United States owning such a vast majority of the country’s 
wealth, the gap between the rich and poor in America is becoming larger and larger.”).  
 46  TRENDS IN FAMILY WEALTH, 1989 TO 2013, supra note 43, at 4 (Exhibit 1).  I use 
quotation marks around “bottom” because the idea of talking about 90% or even 50% of all 
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Wealth inequality has race and sex dimensions, to name just two 
evaluative axes.47  The Institute for Policy Studies reports that white 
households in 2016 had an average wealth of $146,984, whereas for Black 
and Latinx families, those figures were $3,557 and $6,591 respectively.48  
In other words, the average Black family has approximately 2.4% of the 
wealth that the average white family has, and the average Latinx family has 
approximately four percent of the wealth that the average white family 
has.49  Households led by an Asian or Pacific Islander have a median 
household net worth of $59,292 compared to $87,056 for non-Hispanic 
white households.50  Using data derived from the Survey of Consumer 
Finances and U.S. Census, the Pew Center arrives at similar figures 
indicating the same racial disparities.51 
 
households at the lowest rung in any hierarchy seems almost absurd.  
 47  See, e.g., Danaya C. Wright, Disrupting the Wealth Gap Cycles: An Empirical Study 
of Testacy and Wealth, 2019 WISC. L. REV. 295, 301–03 (2019) (discussing differences 
between racial and sex wealth gaps).  
 48  Wealth Inequality in the United States, The Racial Wealth Divide, INEQUALITY, 
https://inequality.org/facts/wealth-inequality (last visited Oct. 4, 2019) (comparing white, 
Black and Latino household wealth in 2016, as well as white household wealth versus all 
other households’ wealth in 1983).  The use of the word “Latinx” in the text of this article is 
an intentional choice, so as to recognize that households may be not made up solely of 
males, females or people who identify as either of those genders.  See, e.g., Tanisha Love 
Ramirez & Zeba Blay, Why People Are Using the Term “Latinx”, HUFFINGTON POST (July 
5, 2016), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/why-people-are-using-the-term-latinx_n_5775332 
8e4b0cc0fa136a159 (“Latinx is the gender-neutral alternative to Latino, Latina and even 
Latin@.  Used by scholars, activists and an increasing number of journalists, Latinx is 
quickly gaining popularity among the general public.  It is part of a ‘linguistic 
revolution’ that aims to move beyond gender binaries and is inclusive of the intersecting 
identities of Latin American descendants.”).  Such usage is not without its critics.  See e.g., 
Stephen Nuño-Pérez & Gwen Aviles, Is “Latinx” Elitist? Some Push Back at the Word’s 
Growing Use, NBC NEWS (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/latinx-
elitist-some-push-back-word-s-growing-use-n957036 (“But as the term gains traction, some 
scholars are pointing out that there are Latinos who don’t see themselves reflected in the 
word.  Some see Latinx as an elitist attempt to erase a history of more traditional gender 
roles, or as a distraction from other pressing issues facing Latinos in the United States.”).  
 49  Wealth Inequality in the United States, supra note 48 (“The median Black family, 
with just over $3,500, owns just 2 percent of the wealth of the nearly $147,000 the median 
White family owns.  The median Latino family, with just over $6,500, owns just 4 percent 
of the wealth of the median White family.  Put differently, the median White family has 41 
times more wealth than the median Black family and 22 times more wealth than the median 
Latino family.”).  
 50  Alfred O. Gottshalck, Net Worth and the Assets of Households: 2002, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU (2008), https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2008/demo/p70-115.pdf (for 
year 2002, reporting median net worth for households headed by householder by race of 
$87,057 (white), $5,446 (Black), $59,292 Asian or Pacific Islander), and $7,950 
(Hispanic)).  
 51  See Rakesh Kochhar & Richard Fry, Wealth Inequality Has Widened Along Racial, 
Ethnic Lines Since End of Great Recession, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.pe 
wresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/12/racial-wealth-gaps-great-recession/ 
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In the United States, women of all colors have always had less 
aggregate wealth than men.52  For 2015, the median net worth of 
households headed by single women was $26,580; whereas for those 
headed by single men, the median was $32,300; and for those headed by 
married-couple households, the median was $187,600.53  In its study of 
individuals with gross assets of two million dollars or more, the Internal 
Revenue Service estimates that men hold sixty percent and women hold 
forty percent of the average net asset value.54  The vast majority of these 
women report that their wealth comes primarily from their husbands or 
other family members.55 
Considering the poorest segments of the U.S. population, 13.2% of all 
women seventy-five and older live in poverty, compared with 11.8% of the 
total population and 11.3% of all men seventy-five and older.56  
Transgender individuals of any age tend to be among the poorest 
Americans, with approximately twenty-nine percent of those surveyed 
 
[https://perma.cc/2WGL-VZJ3] (reporting that in 2013, median net worth of white 
households was thirteen times greater than Black households and ten times greater than 
Hispanic households).  For further discussion of the racial wealth gap, see, e.g., Daria 
Roithmayr, Them That Has, Gets, 27 MISS. C.L. REV. 373, 373–74 (2008); Beverly Moran 
& Stephanie M. Wildman, Race and Wealth Disparity: The Role of Law and the Legal 
System, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1219, 1220 (2007). 
 52  See Carmen Diana Deere & Cheryl R. Doss, The Gender Asset Gap: What Do We 
Know and Why Does It Matter?, 12 FEMINIST ECON. 1, 2–3 (2006) (reporting that women 
and children held 7.2% of national wealth in 1860; that women held 25% of probate wealth 
in 1900; roughly 40% of wealth in the 1950s).  The authors refer to “women” generally 
without taking into account slavery and its impact on the privileged legal status white 
women had compared to all others.  See id.  
 53  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WEALTH, ASSET OWNERSHIP, & DEBT OF HOUSEHOLDS 
DETAILED TABLES 2015 Table 1 (2018), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2015/demo/wea 
lth/wealth-asset-ownership.html.  See also Gwendolyn Griffith, The Evolution of Women’s 
Wealth: Implications for Wealth Planners, 2014 WL 4160088 (2014) (providing similar 
statistics for 2011). 
 54  Griffith, supra note 53, at *4–5 (evaluating distribution of net value across 
individuals holding assets of $2 million or more). 
 55  Griffith, supra note 53, at *9.  See also Wright, supra note 47, at 302–03 (“The sex 
gap is also notable, although it plays out quite differently than the racial wealth gap.  While 
women control overall less wealth than men, of those women who do control significant 
wealth, roughly three-quarters report their wealth was generated primarily from their 
families or their husbands.”). 
 56  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, 2019 ANNUAL SOCIAL & 
ECONOMIC SUPPLEMENT (POV-01), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/in 
come-poverty/cps-pov/pov-01.html#par_textimage_10 (last visited Oct. 15, 2019) 
(providing data for segments of population below poverty level).  See also Amber Christ & 
Tracey Gronniger, Older Women & Poverty, JUST. IN AGING 3–4 (Dec. 2018), 
https://www.justiceinaging.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Older-Women-and-Poverty.pdf 
(reporting poverty levels based on Census Bureau’s Supplemental Poverty Measure); 
Juliette Cubanski et al., How Many Seniors Live in Poverty?, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 2 (Nov. 
2018), files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-How-Many-Seniors-Live-in-Poverty (noting 
greater poverty rates for elderly women).  
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reporting that they live in poverty.57 
Wealth inequality gives rise to multiple concerns.  There are those 
who argue that wealth inequality is, in itself, immoral.58  Others are 
concerned about the consequences of wealth inequality, i.e., that it creates 
undue social and political advantages for the rich.59  Frequently embedded 
in that particular critique is a rhetorical nod to stereotypically “American” 
ideals of egalitarianism.60  In 2013, for example, President Obama opined 
that “[t]his increasing [economic] inequality is most pronounced in our 
country, and it challenges the very essence of who we are as a people.”61  
Similarly, former chair of the Federal Reserve Janet Yellen questioned in a 
public speech whether rising income and wealth inequality is “compatible 
with values rooted in our nation’s history, among them the high value 
Americans have traditionally placed on equality of opportunity.”62 
 
 57  See, e.g., Jillian Edmonds, Transgender People Are Facing Incredibly High Rates of 
Poverty, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR. (Dec. 9, 2016), https://nwlc.org/blog/income-security-is-
elusive-for-many-transgender-people-according-to-u-s-transgend0er-survey (reporting that 
29% of transgender individuals surveyed in 2015 reported they were living in poverty, 
compared with 14% of all people in the United States).  The Census Bureau reports 11.8% 
of the population is living in poverty.  See 2019 ANNUAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 56.  Differences may be attributable to the applicable measurement 
of poverty; the Supplemental Poverty Measure takes into account more than baseline food 
consumption.  See, e.g., Dylan Matthews, The Official Poverty Measure Is Garbage, VOX 
(Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.vox.com/2015/9/16/9337041/supplemental-poverty-measure. 
 58  See e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 74–75 (1971).  See also Xavier 
Marquez, Is Income Inequality Unjust?: Perspectives from Political Philosophy, 7 POL. Q. 
61 (2011); Amy J. Sepinwall, Responsibility, Repair and Redistribution in the Wake of the 
Financial Crisis, 11 GEO. J. L. PUB. POL’Y 301, 313–14 (2013) (describing in general terms 
the Rawlsian luck egalitarianism).  
 59  See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—
AND A PLAN TO STOP IT (2011); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983); Elizabeth 
Anderson, What is the Point of Equality, 109 ETHICS 287, 289 (1999).  
 60  Thomas Piketty locates this rhetoric in its historical context, explaining that at the 
end of the nineteenth century, “in the period known as the Gilded Age, when some US 
industrialists and financiers (for example John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, and J.P. 
Morgan) accumulated unprecedented wealth, many US observers were alarmed by the 
thought that the country was losing its pioneering egalitarian spirit.  To be sure, that spirit 
was partly a myth, but it was also partly justified by comparison with the concentration of 
wealth in Europe.”  PIKETTY, supra note 38, at 348–49. 
 61  Press Release, White House, Remarks by the President on Economic Mobility (Dec. 
4, 2013), https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2013/12/04/1260116/-President-Obama-s-
remarks-on-economic-mobility.  See also Ian Reifowitz, Obama’s Inequality Speech: 
Telling the Progressive Story of American History, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2013), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/obamas-inequality-speech_b_4394169 (quoting President 
Obama’s speech and remarking that “Obama’s telling of that history always features both 
progress as well as our failure to live up to the ideals of equality we lay down at the 
country’s founding.”). 
 62  Janet Yellen, Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Speech at the 
Conference on Economic Opportunity and Inequality, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston: 
“Perspectives on Inequality and Opportunity from the Survey of Consumer Finances” 
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A third cluster of concerns about gross wealth inequality relates to 
macroeconomic issues.  There are commentators who believe that members 
of the segment of the population with low or no savings (i.e., no wealth) do 
not and cannot contribute to economic growth.63  In other words, if people 
live based solely on their incomes, from paycheck to paycheck, those same 
individuals by definition cannot be wealth-producers.64  They may be 
consumers, but they will never create businesses that employ others.65 
Finally, and perhaps most powerfully, is the idea that persistent and 
significant wealth disparity undermines the stability of democratic 
societies.  As American entrepreneur (and self-described “plutocrat”) Nick 
Hanauer has warned, “any society which allows itself to become radically 
and indefensibly unequal eventually faces either an uprising or a police 
state—or both.”66  Comparative law scholar Katharina Pistor makes the 
same point, citing wealth disparity as a major contributing cause of the 
French Revolution.67  Like Obama and Yellen, Pistor rhetorically invokes 
aspirational ideals of equality, noting that wealth inequality extends well 
beyond the United States, “in countries that call themselves democracies, 
with their commitment to self-governance based on majoritarian, not elite, 
rule.  It is hard to reconcile these aspirations with levels of inequality that 
smack of the Ancien Régime.”68  Although lack of records make it difficult 
to measure precisely pre-Revolutionary-era French wealth inequality 
levels, economist Thomas Piketty speculates that “[i]t is possible that the 
top decile’s share attained or even slightly exceeded 90 percent of total 
wealth on the eve of 1789 and the upper centile’s share attained or 
exceeded 60 percent.”69  After the Revolution, France instituted a gift and 
 
(October 17, 2014), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20141017a.htm 
 63  See, e.g., CHUCK COLLINS, 99 TO 1: HOW WEALTH INEQUALITY IS WRECKING THE 
WORLD AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 65–67 (2012). See also Erez Aloni, The Marital 
Wealth Gap, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1, 12 (2018). 
 64  See COLLINS, supra note 63. 
 65  Id. 
 66  Nick Hanauer, To My Fellow Plutocrats: You Can Cure Trumpism, POLITICO (July 
18, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/07/18/to-my-fellow-plutocrats-
you-can-cure-trumpism-215347 (also urging employers to pay workers more, in order to 
enhance individuals’ well-being and stimulate the economy).  See also Nick Hanauer, The 
Pitchforks Are Coming . . . For Us Plutocrats, POLITICO (July/Aug. 2014), https://www.po 
litico.com/magazine/story/2014/06/the-pitchforks-are-coming-for-us-plutocrats-108014; 
Nick Hanauer, Beware Fellow Plutocrats, the Pitchforks Are Coming, TED (Jul. 21, 2017), 
https://www.ted.com/talks/nick_hanauer_beware_fellow_plutocrats_the_pitchforks_are_co
ming/discussion. 
 67  KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES WEALTH AND 
INEQUALITY 2 (2019). 
 68  Id.  
 69  PIKETTY, supra note 38, at 341. 
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estate tax system, along with a wealth registry.70 
These multiple critiques of wealth inequality correctly bring continued 
attention to the wealth gap in the United States (and elsewhere).  The 
causes of wealth inequality are multifaceted and complex, including 
systemic racism and sexism, poor quality education, overincarceration, 
housing segregation, lack of financial literacy, and tax policy itself.71  A 
growing group of scholars point to trusts as a symptom, or perhaps even a 
cause or constitutive structure, of wealth inequality in this country.72  To 
evaluate this claim, one first must understand the available data about trusts 
in the United States.73 
B.  The Frequency and Extent of Trust Use 
For many years, wealthy families have used trusts to preserve and 
protect assets, and also to confer financial benefits on successive 
generations.74  For example, in 1934, John D. Rockefeller, Jr., son of the 
 
 70  PIKETTY, supra note 38, at 337 (calling these taxes and the wealth registry 
“astonishing innovations at the time, notable for their universal scope”).  
 71  See, e.g., Wright, supra note 47, at 303 (“There are countless other factors besides 
estate planning that contribute to the various wealth gaps, including income inequality, 
racism, housing segregation, and lack of education about how to protect and grow wealth.  
Tax policy contributes to the wealth gap by privileging certain types of investments and 
protecting certain kinds of gains and not others.”).  See also Olatunde Johnson, Inclusion, 
Exclusion, and the “New” Economic Inequality, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1647 (2016) (examining 
role of geographical space in financial inequality). 
 72  See, e.g., Ray MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE 
AMERICAN DEAD 76–84 (2010) (critiquing long-term trusts); Iris Goodwin, How the Rich 
Stay Rich: Using a Family Trust Company to Secure a Family Fortune, 40 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 467, 468  (2010) (calling the family trust company “the masterstroke in a series of 
aggressive planning techniques”); Kent D. Schenkel, Exposing the Hocus Pocus of Trusts, 
45 AKRON L. REV. 63, 65–67 (2012) (critiquing, among other features of trusts, the use of 
spendthrift clauses); Phyllis C. Smith, The Estate and Gift Tax Implications of Self-Settled 
Domestic Asset Protection Trust: Can You Really Have Your Cake and Eat It Too?, 44 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 25 (2009) (arguing in favor of estate tax inclusion for self-settled asset 
protection trusts, even when transfers to the trust are treated as completed gift for wealth 
transfer tax purposes); Allison Anna Tait, The Law of High-Wealth Exceptionalism, 71 ALA. 
L. REV. 4 (forthcoming 2019), http://papers.ssrn.com/ abstract_id=3406070 (“the wealth 
management profession has been encouraging high-wealth families to imagine themselves 
as separate, exceptional entities for several decades”); Reid Kress Weisbord, Trust Term 
Extension, 67 FLA. L. REV. 73 (2015) (arguing against use of decanting power to extend 
duration of trust). 
 73  As Zucman notes, there are undoubtedly many Americans with assets located on off-
shore jurisdictions.  See ZUCMAN, supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.  The 
discussion in this Article is limited to family trusts located in the United States. 
 74  See, e.g., Duke of Norfolk’s Case, (1682) 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch.); 3 Chan. Cas.1 
(recognizing as valid a trust for barony title and associated property).  This case is included 
in law school casebooks to illustrate the origins of the common law rule against perpetuities 
as the executory interest in the grantor’s fourth son was certain to vest, if at all, within the 
lifetime of the fourth son, who was also alive at the time of the trust creation.  See, e.g., 
SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 7, at 890–91 (discussing validity of executory interest in 
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founder of Standard Oil, created a trust for the benefit of his six children.75  
In 2002, when in his late eighties, David Rockefeller, the youngest of those 
children wrote that, “[t]hese [1934] trusts, in particular, have been the 
primary source of the preservation, enhancement, and transfer of the 
family’s wealth from generation to generation.”76  Each of the beneficiaries 
had the ability to ask a trust committee “for permission to invade our trust 
for some special purpose,” and via those trusts, the children were able to 
purchase Rockefeller Center from their father in 1948, at a price of $2.2 
million.77  That is equal to approximately twenty-three million dollars 
today.78  Forbes magazine estimates that David Rockefeller’s net worth 
was approximately $3.3 billion at the time of his death.79  If that estimate is 
even close to accurate, then the family trusts were very successful indeed in 
preserving and enhancing family wealth.80 
In the twenty-first century, wealthy business leaders like Warren 
Buffett and Bill Gates have announced publicly that they will leave 
minimal wealth to their heirs.81  Over 150 billionaires have signed Buffett 
and Gates’ Giving Pledge, a public promise to donate the bulk of their 
 
Duke of Norfolk’s case). 
 75  DAVID ROCKEFELLER, MEMOIRS 463 (2002) (describing creation of family trusts by 
John D. Rockefeller, Jr. in 1934).  From 1996 through 2003, I was an attorney in the Trusts 
& Estates Department at Milbank LLP (then Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP), a 
firm that represented (and represents) members of the Rockefeller family.  See Bridget J. 
Crawford, Faculty Profile, PACE LAW SCHOOL, https://law.pace.edu/faculty/bridget-j-
crawford (last visited Oct. 1, 2019), and David Rockefeller Obituary Notice by Milbank, 
Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/y6j3k7x2 
(“Milbank is proud to have had a close relationship with the Rockefeller family since the 
early 20th century, and David Rockefeller continued this relationship . . . .  Mr. Rockefeller 
worked with many of our partners on numerous important transactions over the years—
among them corporate, real estate, trusts and estates, and philanthropic.”).  All information 
in this article about any member of the Rockefeller family comes from publicly-available 
sources. 
 76  See ROCKEFELLER, supra note 75. 
 77  See ROCKEFELLER, supra note 75, at 464–69 (describing the role his brother Nelson 
Rockefeller played in “persuading Father to sell us the property in 1948 for $2.2 million”).   
 78  See Calculate the Value of $100 in 1948, DOLLAR TIMES, https://www.dollartimes.com 
/inflation/inflation.php?amount=100&year=1948 (last visited Sept. 29, 2019) (calculating 
$2.2 million in 1948 as worth $23,620,197 in 2019).  
 79  #581 David Rockefeller, Sr., FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/profile/david-rocke 
feller-sr/?list=billionaires#668ed7af6442 (last visited Oct. 15, 2019). 
 80  See id. 
 81  See, e.g., Roxanne Roberts, Why the Super-Rich Aren’t Leaving Much of Their 
Fortunes to Their Kids, WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/life 
style/style/why-the-very-rich-arent-giving-much-of-their-fortunes-to-their-kids/2014/08/10/ 
4a9551b4-1ccc-11e4-82f9-2cd6fa8da5c4_story.html (“Bill and Melinda Gates are giving a 
reported $10 million for each of their three children: pocket change compared with their 
$76 billion. Buffett’s three kids each have a $2 billion foundation funded by Dear Old Dad.  
The rest of his money?  Going to charity . . . .”). 
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wealth to charity.82  In addition to having philanthropic intentions, some of 
these ultra-wealthy people are concerned that successive generations not be 
burdened (or boosted) by inherited wealth.83  Yet many other wealthy 
Americans have taken advantage of recent changes in trust laws to create 
multi-million dollar trusts that may last for an unlimited time period, 
forever protecting assets from taxation and creditors.84 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately determine the number of 
family trusts presently in operation in the United States.85  When a grantor 
creates a trust, there is no filing of any certificate or document with the 
state or federal government.86  The trustee of a trust may be a private 
individual or a bank or a trust company.87  Private individuals acting as 
trustees are not required to report their fiduciary holdings to the 
government. In contrast, when a bank or trust company that is part of the 
Federal Reserve System acts as trustee, that institution must make reports 
each year to various federal agencies.88  The institution must disclose the 
number of trust accounts under its management and the size of the trust 
holdings.89  At the end of 2015, these federally regulated banks and other 
institutions were the trustees of approximately 710,000 accounts (including 
 
 82  See, e.g., Peter Kotecki, The Billionaire “Giving Pledge” Signed by Bill Gates and 
Elon Musk Could Soon Be Worth Up to $600 Billion, BUS. INSIDER (Jul. 18, 2018), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/bill-gates-elon-musk-giving-pledge-may-reach-600-
billion-2018-7 (describing Gifting Pledge and naming as signatories Elon Musk and Mark 
Zuckerberg, but noting that pledge does not appear to be binding). 
 83  See Roberts, supra note 81 (quoting recording artist Sting as saying of his estimated 
$300 million net worth, “I certainly don’t want to leave them trust funds that are albatrosses 
round their necks.  They have to work.  All my kids know that and they rarely ask me for 
anything, which I really respect and appreciate.”). 
 84  See, e.g., McCouch, supra note 14 (describing repeal of rule against perpetuities in 
multiple U.S. jurisdictions). 
 85  See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text (detailing the type of trusts that are 
the focus of this Article).  Distinguish the gift-type trust from revocable trusts intended as 
will substitutes; charitable trusts; trusts to provide asset management for disabled or 
otherwise incapacitated beneficiaries; or business trusts, to give a few examples.  On the 
various types of trusts, see, e.g., BOGERT’S TRUST AND TRUSTEES § 1 (describing general 
categories of trusts). 
 86  Indeed, trusts for property other than real property can be created by oral declaration.  
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TRUSTS § 20 (AM. LAW. INST. 2019) (“Validity of Oral 
Inter Vivos Trusts”).   
 87  See, e.g., BOGERT’S TRUST AND TRUSTEES, supra note 85, § 121 (detailing multiple 
factors that inform a grantor’s selection of a trustee and the range of legal persons who may 
act as trustee). 
 88  Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust 
Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 387–88 (2005) 
(citing federal statutes that make mandatory certain filings with four different federal 
agencies). 
 89  Id. at 388. 
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charitable trusts) with an aggregate value of approximately $918 billion.90  
Because reporting rules apply only to accounts for which the institution is 
acting as trustee, however, these figures will necessarily represent only a 
portion of the trusts in operation. 
Professors Robert Sitkoff and Max Schanzenbach were among the 
first to realize the importance of this publicly available federal banking 
information to the study of trusts.  In 2005, they reported the results of their 
empirical investigation of the consequences of certain states’ repeal of the 
rule against perpetuities.91  They found that between 1997 and 2003, 
approximately $100 billion worth of trust assets flowed to states that had 
effectively repealed the rule.92  The authors cabin their results by 
explaining that it is impossible to know whether this figure represents the 
creation of new trusts or the relocation of existing trusts to repeal states.93  
In any event, the authors also note that studies based on the federally 
available data are incomplete, because they include only trust accounts for 
which a reporting institution is acting as trustee.94 
To get a better understanding of the total number of trusts and the 
aggregate wealth they hold, one naturally looks to publicly available tax 
data.  A family trust typically obtains its own taxpayer identification 
number,95 but the Internal Revenue Service does not publicly disclose how 
many identification numbers it issues to trusts each year.  And even if the 
IRS did make this information available, the fact that a trust received a 
taxpayer identification number at some point does not mean that the trust is 
still in existence.  The trust may have terminated or otherwise expired 
according to its terms.  For that reason, knowing the number of taxpayer 
identification numbers issued to trusts will not necessarily help determine 
 
 90  SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 7, at 393. 
 91  Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 88, at 376. 
 92  Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 88, at 404 (“Within the timeframe of our 
sample, 17 states abolished the RAP with a resulting average increase of $6 billion in trust 
assets per state.  This implies that as of 2003, roughly $100 billion in trust funds have 
poured into the states that abolished the Rule ($6 billion per state * 17 states = $102 billion 
in total assets).”). 
 93  Id. (“[W]e cannot discern the extent to which the observed increase in trust assets 
reflects an inflow of newly created trusts or the poaching of already existing trusts.”). 
 94  Id. (“Because our sample includes only trusts administered by federally reporting 
institutions, our estimates probably understate the total increase in trust assets experienced 
by the abolishing states.”); Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 88, at 387–88 (citing federal 
statutes that make mandatory certain filings with four different federal agencies). 
 95  Taxpayer Identification Numbers, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, https://www.irs.gov/ 
individuals/international-taxpayers/taxpayer-identification-numbers-tin (last visited Oct. 4, 
2019) (“An Employer Identification Number (EIN) is also known as a federal tax 
identification number, and is used to identify a business entity.  It is also used by estates and 
trusts which have income which is required to be reported on Form 1041, U.S. Income Tax 
Return for Estates and Trusts.”). 
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the actual number of existing family trusts or the extent of their holdings. 
Federal fiduciary income tax returns—or the tax returns for trusts—
provide partial additional insight into the number of trusts in existence in 
any particular year.96  For the tax year 2014, the Internal Revenue Service 
received over 3.1 million trust income tax returns reporting approximately 
$142 billion of aggregate net income.97  Approximately 637,000 trusts paid 
out $5.3 million in aggregate fiduciary fees.98  This number does not give a 
complete picture of all trusts in the United States, however, because many 
trusts are not required to file income tax returns at all.99 
State income tax data are not necessarily illuminating, either. Each 
state takes a different approach to the income taxation of trusts.  New York, 
for example, imposes a tax on an irrevocable trust that is created under the 
will of a person domiciled in the state. New York also imposes a tax on an 
irrevocable trust if a trustee is domiciled in the state, the trust has source 
income in the state, or the trust property is located in the state.100  Florida, 
in contrast, imposes no tax at all on most trusts.101 
From the patchwork of available information about federal reporting 
institutions’ holdings and trusts’ federal tax returns, one cannot accurately 
estimate the number of all family trusts or their holdings.  There likely are 
hundreds of millions of private express trusts presently in existence.102  
These trusts likely hold assets worth trillions of dollars.103  But a complete 
 
 96  See Form 1041, U.S. Income Tax Return for Estates and Trusts 2018, INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERVICE, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1041.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2019) 
(income tax return to be filed by a decedent’s estate or any one of several types of trusts). 
 97  INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME BUREAU, FIDUCIARY RETURNS – 
SOURCES OF INCOME, DEDUCTIONS, AND TAX LIABILITY – TAX STATUS AND SIZE OF GROSS 
INCOME 2014, https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-fiduciary-returns-sources-of-
income-deductions-and-tax-liability-tax-status-and-size-of-gross-income (last visited Oct. 
15, 2019). 
 98  Id. at   
 99  See 26 U.S.C §§ 671–79 (2018) (providing rules relevant for determining multiple 
circumstances in which trust income or other tax items are attributable to the grantor or 
someone other than the trust). See also Instructions for Form 1041, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERVICE, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1041.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2019) (listing 
“Who Must File”).  
 100  See N.Y. TAX LAW § 605(b)(3)(C) (McKinney 2014) (defining “resident trust” 
subject to taxation in the state); N.Y. TAX LAW § 605(b)(3)(D) (McKinney 2014) 
(describing those resident trusts not subject to state income taxation).  
 101  See generally RICHARD W. NENNO, BASES OF STATE INCOME TAXATION OF 
NONGRANTOR TRUSTS FOR 2018 (2019), https://www.actec.org/assets/1/6/Nenno_state_non 
grantor_tax_survey.pdf.  Other states that do not impose income tax on trusts include 
Alaska, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas and Wyoming. See id.  
 102  See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 103  If reporting institutions held $918 billion in assets at the end of 2015, supra note 88 
and accompanying text, it is likely that the total of all assets held in all trusts reaches the 
trillions, once one includes trusts with private trustees and any trust assets such as real 
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picture remains to be drawn.  The lack of clarity about how many trusts 
there are and how much wealth these trusts hold, combined with the stark 
facts of wealth inequality,104 mean that trusts are an easy target for critics.  
When, during the 2018-2019 term, the Supreme Court took up its first case 
in over sixty years concerning the state income taxation of trusts, one 
particular trust for a North Carolina woman named Kimberley Rice 
Kaestner brought a spotlight to family trusts.105 
III.  KAESTNER TRUST AND DUE PROCESS 
A.  Background 
The story of how Kimberley Rice Kaestner came to be the beneficiary 
of a family trust begins in 1992.  After a brief stint practicing law with an 
elite New York Law firm, Joseph Lee Rice had a long and successful 
career in private equity.106  In 1992, when he was sixty years old, Rice 
transferred $100,000 to an irrevocable trust for the benefit of his 
descendants.107  At that time, the beneficiaries were Rice’s daughter 
Kimberley, age twenty-three, and his two other children, Daniel and Lee.108  
Rice was a New York resident and domiciliary; so was the initial trustee, 
William Matteson.109  The trust was subject to taxation by the State of New 
York. In 1995, Matteson, the initial trustee, moved to Florida.110  
Subsequently, Kimberley Rice Kaestner moved to North Carolina, where 
 
property and closely-held business interests that cannot be maintained in a bank or trust 
company.  This is, however, speculation only.  
 104  See supra Part II.A.  
 105  See N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr., 139 S. Ct. 
2213, 2218 (2019); supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 106  See Founder, Joseph L. Rice, III, CDR-INC.COM, https://www.cdr-
inc.com/professionals/joseph-l.-rice-iii (last visited Oct. 15, 2019) (providing biographical 
information for Joseph Lee Rice III); Joseph L. Rice III, REVOLVY.COM, 
https://www.revolvy.com/page/Joseph-L.-Rice-III (last visited Oct. 15, 2019) (providing 
biographical information for Joseph Lee Rice III). 
 107  Complaint at ¶ 11, Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. N.C. Dep’t of 
Revenue, No. 12 CVS 8740, 2015 WL 1880607 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2015), 2012 WL 
12282023 [hereinafter Complaint], aff’d, 789 S.E. 645 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016), aff’d 814 
S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 2018), aff’d 139 S. Ct. 2213 (2019).  See also Joint Appendix, Kimberley 
Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 12 CVS 8740, 2015 WL 
1880607 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2015), 2018 WL 7469782, aff’d, 789 S.E. 645 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2016), aff’d 814 S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 2018), aff’d 139 S. Ct. 2213 (2019); Affidavit of 
David H. Bernstein, Appendix to Exhibit A, Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. 
N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 12 CVS 8740, 2015 WL 1880607 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 
2015), 2012 WL 12282023 [hereinafter Bernstein Affidavit], aff’d, 789 S.E. 645 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2016), aff’d 814 S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 2018), aff’d 139 S. Ct. 2213 (2019). 
 108  Complaint, supra note 107,  at ¶ 17.  
 109  Complaint, supra note 107,  at ¶ 13. 
 110  Complaint, supra note 107,  at ¶ 16. 
CRAWFORD (DO NOT DELETE) 11/14/2019  6:37 PM 
308 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:289 
she established both her residence and domicile.111 
The trust created by Rice provided that on the tenth anniversary of the 
trust’s creation, i.e., on December 30, 2002, the trust divided into separate 
shares, with one share held in further trust for each of Rice’s children and 
their respective descendants as “Beneficiaries” of that separate share 
trust.112  During both the initial ten-year term of the trust and the continued 
administration of the separate share trusts, the trust instrument directed the 
trustee to consider the trust funds a “family asset” and “to be liberal in the 
exercise of discretion . . . to meet the needs of the Beneficiaries, including, 
without limitation, to provide for their health, education and welfare, to 
purchase or provide a home for them, and to aid them at the time of 
marriage or in setting up a business, rather than to preserve such 
principal.”113  On the adult child’s fortieth birthday, the trust would 
terminate automatically, and the adult child would receive all of the trust 
assets.114 
After Matteson resigned as initial trustee in 2005, David H. Bernstein, 
a resident and domiciliary of Connecticut, became the successor trustee.  
Shortly thereafter, Bernstein split the separate share trusts for investment 
purposes.  (Previously it seems that they were split only for administrative 
purposes.)115 
When Kimberley Rice Kaestner found out about the trust for her 
benefit in 2006, she was approximately 37 years old.116  At that time, her 
 
 111  See Complaint, supra note 107,  at ¶ 17 (stating that Kaestner moved to North 
Carolina in 1997); Bernstein Affidavit at ¶ 8 (stating that Kaestner “moved to North 
Carolina in 1997). 
 112  Complaint, supra note 107, at ¶ 17. 
 113  Copy of Trust Agreement at ¶ 1.4(c), Appendix A to Affidavit of David H. 
Bernstein, Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 12-
CVS-8740, 2015 WL 1880607 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2015), 2012 WL 12282023 
[hereinafter Trust Agreement] (stating that Kaestner “moved to North Carolina in 1997, 
almost five years after the Family Trust’s creation”), aff’d, 789 S.E. 645 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2016), aff’d 814 S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 2018), aff’d 139 S. Ct. 2213 (2019). 
 114  Trust Agreement, supra note 113, at ¶ 1.2(c). 
 115  Bernstein Deposition at 91–93, Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. N.C. 
Dep’t of Revenue, No. 12-CVS-8740, 2015 WL 1880607 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2015), 
2012 WL 12282023 [hereinafter Bernstein Deposition] (stating that Kaestner “moved to 
North Carolina in 1997, almost five years after the Family Trust’s creation”), aff’d, 789 S.E. 
645 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016), aff’d 814 S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 2018), aff’d 139 S. Ct. 2213 (2019).  
Bernstein did so because one of Rice’s three children was substantially younger than the 
others, and Bernstein believed that the younger child’s trust should be invested differently. 
Id. (“I didn’t believe that the investment philosophy for all three trusts needed to be the 
same.  One of Mr. Rice’s children, for example, is much younger, and so has a very 
different investment time frame.”).   
 116  Kimberley Rice Kaestner did not find out about the trust for benefit until 2006, when 
she was approximately 37 years old.  Kaestner Deposition at 84, Kimberley Rice Kaestner 
1992 Family Tr. v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 12-CVS-8740, 2015 WL 1880607 (N.C. 
CRAWFORDCRAWFORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/14/2019  6:37 PM 
2019] MAGICAL THINKING AND TRUSTS 309 
trust had approximately $13 million in assets.117  Kaestner expressed 
trepidation about managing that amount of money when she turned forty.118  
Undoubtedly informed by this view, Bernstein exercised the authority 
granted to him as trustee under New York law to “decant” the trust assets 
into a further trust that did not terminate at Kaestner’s fortieth birthday.119 
During the years 2005 through 2008 inclusive, Bernstein, as trustee of 
Kaestner’s separate share trust—The Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 
Family Trust—paid more than $1.3 million in income tax to the State of 
North Carolina.120  Bernstein filed for a refund on two grounds.  He 
asserted first that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
prevented North Carolina from imposing tax on the trust’s income, given 
that the trust’s only connection with the forum state was Kaestner’s 
residence and that she received no distributions of income from the trust 
during those years.121  The trustee next argued that the Commerce Clause of 
Article I of the U.S. Constitution prohibited North Carolina from taxing the 
trust, because there was no substantial nexus between the forum 
jurisdiction and the taxed entity (i.e., the trust).122 
The Superior Court of North Carolina, Wake County, granted the 
trustee’s motion for summary judgment.123  The Superior Court reasoned 
that the North Carolina taxing statute violated both the Due Process Clause, 
because the trustee lacked the necessary minimum contacts in the state,124 
 
Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2015), 2012 WL 12282023 [hereinafter Kaestner Deposition], aff’d, 789 
S.E. 645 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016), aff’d 814 S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 2018), aff’d 139 S. Ct. 2213 
(2019). 
 117  Id.  
 118  Id. (“[My father and I] had several discussions, and I felt nervous about being given 
that sum of money and unsure as to whether I would do a good job with that money.”). 
 119  See Bernstein Deposition, supra note 115, at 96.  The basic theory behind decanting 
is that if a trustee had sole and absolute discretion to pay all of the trust assets to a trust 
beneficiary, transferring them to a trust for the same beneficiary is an exercise of a lesser 
included power.  For a general introduction to the topic of decanting, the details of which 
are beyond the scope of this article, see, e.g., William R. Culp & Briani Bennett Mellen, 
Trust Decanting: An Overview and Introduction to Creative Planning Opportunities, 45 
REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 1 (2010); Ronald R. Volkmer, Common Law Trust Decanting, 
41 EST. PLAN. 43 (2014).  For a comprehensive overview of the tax consequences of 
decanting, including potential gift and estate tax consequences to a beneficiary, see Diana 
S.C. Zeydel & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Tax Effects of Decanting—Obtaining and 
Preserving the Benefits, 111 J. TAX’N 288 (2009). 
 120  See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 107, at ¶¶ 24–25. 
 121  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law”).  Complaint, supra note 107, at ¶¶ 5–6.   
 122  Complaint, supra note 107, at ¶¶ 37–38.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (reserving 
to Congress the sole power to regulate commerce among the states). 
 123  Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 12-CVS-
8740, 2015 WL 1880607, at *1–2 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2015), aff’d, 789 S.E. 645 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 2016), aff’d 814 S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 2018), aff’d 139 S. Ct. 2213 (2019).  
 124  Id. at *17–21. 
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and the Commerce Clause, because the state did not have a “substantial 
nexus” with the trust that was “fairly related” to any services the state 
provided.125 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina affirmed the trial 
court’s grant of the trustee’s motion for summary judgment, on the grounds 
that the trust did not have minimum contacts with the state, given that no 
trust administration took place in the state, no trust property was located in 
the state, the trustee was not a domiciliary or resident of the state, and the 
beneficiary received no distributions of income while in the state.126  
Having decided the case on due process grounds, the Court of Appeals did 
not reach the Commerce Clause issue.127 
Although the State of North Carolina lost its case at both the trial 
court and appellate levels, it appealed to the North Carolina Supreme 
Court.  The state Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower courts, 
again citing the lack of minimum contacts between the state and the trust.128  
The North Carolina Department of Revenue then appealed to the Supreme 
Court of the United States.129 
B.  The Supreme Court’s Due Process Jurisprudence 
The issue in Kaestner Trust as framed by the Supreme Court was 
whether North Carolina’s imposition of tax on trust income that is for the 
“benefit of” a North Carolina resident violates the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.130  The Court held that the North Carolina 
statute did violate the Due Process Clause in this case, on the grounds that 
Kaestner did not have “some degree of possession, control, or enjoyment of 
the trust property or a right to receive that property.”131  The Court also 
 
 125  Id. at *26–32.  
 126  Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 789 S.E. 645, 
648-51 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016), aff’d 814 S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 2018), aff’d 139 S. Ct. 2213 (2019). 
 127  Id. at 651. 
 128  Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 814 S.E.2d 43, 
51 (N.C. 2018), aff’d 139 S. Ct. 2213 (2019) (“For taxation of a foreign trust to satisfy the 
due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment and the similar pledge in Article I, 
Section 19 of our state constitution, the trust must have some minimum contacts with the 
State of North Carolina such that the trust enjoys the benefits and protections of the State.  
When, as here, the income of a foreign trust is subject to taxation solely based on its 
beneficiaries’ availing themselves of the benefits of our economy and the protections 
afforded by our laws, those guarantees are violated.”).  
 129  Various amici had filed briefs in favor of Petitioner, the North Carolina Department 
of Revenue.  The docket shows a total of fourteen amicus briefs filed: three in support of the 
Petitioner, the North Carolina Department of Revenue; nine in support of Respondent, the 
Trustee of The Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust; and two neutral briefs.  N.C. 
Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr., 139 S. Ct. 2213 (2019).  
 130  Id. at 2217 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 105–160.2 (2017)). 
 131  Id. at 2222. 
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rejected the argument advanced by North Carolina that if the state could 
not tax trusts based solely on the beneficiary’s residence there, all state tax 
systems would be undermined, pointing out that “North Carolina is one of a 
small handful of States that rely on beneficiary residence as a sole basis for 
trust taxation, and one of an even smaller number that will rely on the 
residence of beneficiaries regardless of whether the beneficiary is certain to 
receive trust assets.”132 
Shortly after the North Carolina Supreme Court issued its opinion in 
Kaestner Trust, but before the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in 
the case, the Court had issued a landmark ruling in South Dakota v. 
Wayfair, which upheld a state income tax imposed on certain out of state 
retailers that lacked a physical presence in the state.133  In doing so, the 
Court partially overruled its prior decision in Quill Corp. v. North 
Dakota.134  For that reason, some commentators speculated that the Court 
might be inclined to apply a “no trust presence required” analysis in 
Kaestner Trust.135  But Wayfair was decided under the Commerce Clause, 
not the Due Process Clause (the basis for the Kaestner Trust challenge to 
the North Carolina tax), so the Wayfair analysis did not apply to Kaestner 
Trust.136 
In deciding in favor of the trustee in Kaestner Trust, the Court instead 
relied on its earlier due process analysis in Quill, which was not overruled 
by Wayfair, to require a two-step test.  First, there must be “some definite 
link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property 
or transaction it seeks to tax.”137  Second, the income taxable to the state 
must be “rationally related to the ‘value connected with the taxing 
State.’”138  In evaluating the first part of the test—the minimum 
connection—Justice Sotomayor, writing for a unanimous Court, applied the 
“minimum contacts” test of International Shoe.139  The Court reasoned that 
 
 132  Id. at 2225 (“[T]he State argues that ruling in favor of the Trust will undermine 
numerous state taxation regimes.  Today’s ruling will have no such sweeping effect.  North 
Carolina is one of a small handful of states that rely on the residency of beneficiaries 
regardless of whether the beneficiary is certain to receive trust assets.”) (citation omitted).  
 133  South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).  
 134  Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (finding under Commerce Clause 
that a state must have a “substantial nexus” in order to impose sales and use tax on out of 
retailer, and that nexus not satisfied where the company had no sales representatives or 
stores in the jurisdiction), overruled in part by Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2080. 
 135  See, e.g., Daniel Mudd, I’ve Got Trust Issues—Are Nonresident Trusts the New 
Nexus Fight, 28 J. MULTISTATE TAX’N 35, 37 (2018). 
 136  Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2091. 
 137  Id. at 2220 (citing Quill, 504 U.S. at 308) (internal quotations omitted). 
 138  Id. (citing Quill, 504 U.S. at 308). 
 139  Id. at 2220.  See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (finding 
that defendant must have “certain minimum contacts” with the State so that subjecting the 
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the test was not satisfied in this case for multiple reasons.  Justice 
Sotomayor cited the facts that the trustee resided out of state, the trust 
records and assets were maintained out of state, no trust property was held 
in the state, the trust grantor never resided in North Carolina, trust income 
was not distributed to any beneficiary in North Carolina, and the 
beneficiaries had “no right to demand income and are uncertain to ever 
receive it.”140  The beneficiaries simply lived in North Carolina, and 
residency alone does not constitute “minimum contacts,” Justice 
Sotomayor reasoned.141 
In its opinion, the Court distinguished this case from those involving 
trusts that make income distributions to beneficiaries located in the state, 
have a resident trustee, hold assets in the state, or conduct trust 
administration in the state.142  The concurring opinion written by Justice 
Alito, and joined by Justice Roberts and Justice Gorsuch, discussed two 
cases (also cited in the unanimous opinion) that rejected as unconstitutional 
attempts by the Commonwealth of Virginia to impose a tax on 
undistributed trust assets to which the beneficiaries were not entitled, and 
where the trust otherwise had no connection to Virginia.143  For Justice 
Alito, these cases were outcome-determinative, and the Court’s failure to 
consider other factual scenarios was not an invitation to “open for 
reconsideration any points resolved by our prior decisions.”144  To the 
casual reader, it would appear that the Court considered this to be a 
relatively easy case, and that the Court believes that it has provided 
adequate guidance on most questions involving the state income taxation of 
trusts. 
Before the oral argument in Kaestner Trust, in an essay published in 
the UCLA Law Review Discourse, Professor Michelle Simon and I 
accurately predicted how the Court would rule, and that the Court would 
base its decision on the determination that an in-state beneficiary’s 
residence, without other connections between the trust and the taxing 
jurisdiction, does not satisfy the “minimum contacts” test of International 
Shoe.145  What we did not predict was the strong reaction from academics 
 
defendant to jurisdiction in the state “does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.’”). 
 140  Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2221. 
 141  Id. at 2220–21. 
 142  Id. at 2220 (citing Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Greenough v. Tax 
Assessors of Newport, 331 U.S. 486 (1947); Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939); 
Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U.S. 12 (1920)).  
 143  Id. at 2227–28 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore 
v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83 (1929) and Brooke v. Norfolk, 277 U.S. 27 (1928)). 
 144  See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 145  Bridget J. Crawford & Michelle S. Simon, The Supreme Court, Due Process and 
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who felt that the Court had either missed an opportunity to minimize 
strategic tax planning by wealthy individuals or that the Court 
fundamentally misunderstands how family trusts operate.  The next Part 
engages with those reactions and suggests that they are grounded more 
squarely in notions of fair play—and an intellectual tradition critical of 
wealth inequality146—than legal rules of civil procedure or substantive 
doctrine governing trusts or taxation. 
IV.  TRUST CRITIQUES 
Undoubtedly, there will be much written in the coming months and 
years about the Court’s decision in Kaestner Trust.147  Two national 
colleagues, Professor Carla Spivack and Professor Daniel Hemel, were 
among the first to publish essays after the Court issued its opinion on June 
21, 2019. Spivack and Hemel already were familiar with the case; they 
were among several law professors who signed (or had a role in drafting 
and signed) one of the fourteen amici briefs submitted to the Court in 
Kaestner Trust.148  Spivack joined one brief in favor of the Petitioner, the 
North Carolina Department of Revenue.149  Hemel co-wrote and signed a 
 
State Income Taxation of Trusts, 67 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 2, 12–17 (2019) (accurately 
predicting, prior to the date that the Court heard oral arguments in Kaestner Trust, that the 
Court would rule in favor of the trustee and explaining the reasons the Court would do so).  
We acknowledge in our essay that the lack of uniformity in state income tax laws makes it 
possible, even in states that impose income tax on trusts, for some trusts to avoid income 
taxation altogether, and so those states might want to adopt so-called “throw-back” tax rules 
to recapture income attributable to the time period that a beneficiary lived in the jurisdiction, 
but did not receive until after moving out of the state.  Id. at 17. 
 146  See generally PIKETTY, supra note 38.  I use the term “critical” here in the dictionary 
sense of tending to criticize, as opposed to referring to an intellectual tradition of trust 
scholarship in the tradition of Critical Legal Studies, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Race 
Theory, or Critical Tax Theory, for example.  See Critical, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 
(2019).  See also Bridget J. Crawford & Anthony C. Infanti, A Critical Research Agenda for 
Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 49 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 317, 318 (2014) (defining critical 
trusts and estates scholarship as concerned with “examining why the law has developed in 
the way it has and considering what impact the law has on historically disempowered groups 
such as people of color; women of all colors; lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
individuals; low-income and poor individuals; the disabled; and nontraditional families”). 
 147  The Supreme Court does not take many estate and gift tax cases, so lawyers and 
professors who specialize in this area are usually enthusiastic about writing about them 
when opportunities arise.  See, e.g., Bridget J. Crawford, Foreword – The Supreme Court’s 
Estate Planning Jurisprudence, 42 ACTEC L.J. 1, 1 (2016) (describing “overwhelmingly 
positive” and “rapid” response to a call for contributions to an issue of the American 
College of Trust and Estate Counsel Law Journal devoted to the role of the Supreme Court 
in the “development of contemporary estate planning practice”). 
 148  See supra note 129. 
 149  Brief for Law Professors John V. Orth et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr., 139 S. Ct. 2213 (2019) 
(listing as additional amici Kent D. Schenkel, Carla Spivack and Danaya C. Wright). 
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separate brief, also in support of the Petitioner.150 
In highlighting the commentaries of Spivack and Hemel, the aim in 
this Part is not to undertake a point-by-point analysis of perceived 
substantive errors or misperceptions in their particular analyses; reasonable 
minds disagree about multiple issues in the case.151  Rather, the essays of 
Spivack and Hemel are significant because they raise larger concerns that 
help frame new discussions of wealth inequality.  This Part locates the 
authors’ specific discussions of the Kaestner Trust case in the growing 
body of critical academic analysis of family trusts generally.  Taken in 
aggregate, the critiques can serve as a springboard for imagining a 
dramatically different legal approach to trusts, and one that could reduce 
the wealth gap. 
A.  The Liberal Property Approach 
Consider first Professor Spivack’s essay “Due Process, State Taxation 
of Trusts and the Myth of the Powerless Beneficiary: A Response to 
Bridget Crawford and Michelle Simon.”152  Spivack writes that Kaestner 
Trust is “a rare opportunity for the Court to address the tax inequity that 
allows the wealthy to accumulate assets tax free and in so doing, force 
those with less to make up the difference and deplete the public fisc.  It 
offers a rare opportunity for the Court to see through the trust’s sleight of 
hand.”153  Spivack’s essay responds to the arguments in favor of the trustee, 
not the Court’s actual decision. (Spivack wrote her essay before—but the 
journal published it after—the Court issued its ruling).154  In her focus on 
the details of the Kaestner Trust case, Spivack makes three larger 
contributions to the conceptual conversation about trusts. 
 
 150  Brief for Tax Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, N.C. Dep’t of 
Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr., 139 S. Ct. 2213 (2019) (listing as 
amici Daniel Hemel, Brian Galle, David Gamage, Michael Knoll, Ruth Mason, and Adam 
Thimmesch). 
 151  As evidence that thoughtful lawyers disagree about many issues in the Kaestner 
Trust case, consider the multiple amici briefs submitted in the case.  See supra notes 148–
150 and accompanying text.  In my view, the analyses in the briefs submitted on behalf of 
the Petitioner, the North Carolina Department of Revenue, as well as subsequent analyses 
by Spivack and Hemel, are substantively flawed on many levels.  What I see as errors and 
misapplication of the law (but Spivack and Hemel do not) can be addressed in future 
dialogue, if we choose.  The aim here, however, is to engage with the themes in these 
critiques and to explore how they can contribute to a more focused discussion about the 
relationship of trusts and wealth inequality.  See infra Part IV.A.  
 152  Carla Spivack, Due Process, State Taxation of Trusts and the Myth of the Powerless 
Beneficiary: A Response to Bridget Crawford and Michelle Simon, 67 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 
46 (2019). 
 153  Id. at 68–69. 
 154  Email from Carla Spivack to Bridget Crawford (July 24, 2019 16:53 EDT) (on file 
with author). 
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First, Spivack’s analysis proceeds from a liberal private property 
perspective, and that leads her to particular results in the trust context.  In 
the words of U.K. scholar Johanna Jacques, the liberal private property 
view treats property as “primarily about persons and their interests, things 
playing merely a secondary role.”155  That is, property exists only in 
relationship to a person who has or seeks ownership and the “wedge” that 
the trust places between a trust’s beneficiaries and the trust property has 
little or no independent significance.156 
In Spivack’s liberal approach to private property, there is little (if any) 
room for trusts.  She decries the focus on the state’s jurisdiction over the 
trust as a “red herring,” because the trust, in her view, is not subject to 
taxation: “what is being taxed is the beneficiary’s share of trust income—
thus, the beneficiary.”157  Spivack assumes that the beneficiary must (and 
should) be treated as the owner of the trust property for income tax 
purposes, even if no income is distributed out to her.  The trust property 
cannot belong to the trustee, because the trustee “by definition is barred 
from enjoying any beneficial interest in the trust property—the only person 
who may receive beneficial interest is the beneficiary.”158  In Spivack’s 
world, if the trust property does not belong legally to the grantor, and 
cannot belong beneficially to the trustee, then it must belong for income tax 
purposes to the beneficiary.159  This is not, however, the way that any of the 
 
 155  Jacques, supra note 8, at 202 (emphasis in the original). 
 156  Jacques, supra note 8, at 202, 204 (describing the underlying premise of the liberal 
view of property as “the whole purpose of property is to provide and justify control by 
persons over things”). 
 157  Spivack, supra note 152, at 50.  
 158  Id. (“Taxing the beneficiary in this case is entirely consistent with the basic principle 
of tax law that a person who controls and receives benefit from income should pay taxes on 
it.”).  
 159  Spivack cites tax law in support of this either/or proposition.  Spivack, supra note 
152, at 61 (“Tax law also supports the conclusion that the beneficiary here had sufficient 
power over her share of trust income to be considered in control of it for tax 
purposes. . . .  [I]f the trust instructs the trust to distribute funds to a beneficiary for her 
‘health education and welfare,’ the gift is considered complete because the beneficiary can 
successfully force a distribution that falls within that standard.”).  It is axiomatic, however, 
that different rules apply for income, estate and gift tax purposes.  The existence of an 
ascertainable standard in a trust causes a transfer to a trust to be treated as complete for gift 
tax purposes in those cases where the grantor is also the trustee.  See 26 U.S.C. § 2511 
(2018), Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(g)(2), § 25.2511-2(e) (2018) (emphasis added).  The 
ascertainable standard also will cause the gift to be treated as complete for income tax 
purposes, where the grantor is acting as trustee, causing beneficiary to be taxed on the trust 
income.  26 U.S.C. § 674(b)(5)(A).  In Kaestner Trust, the grantor was not acting as trustee, 
however.  The gift was complete for estate tax purposes because the trust was irrevocable 
and the grantor retained no “strings” over the trust property.  See 26 U.S.C. §§ 2036–2038. 
Generally speaking, the trust pays tax on accumulated trust income; the beneficiaries pay tax 
on distributed and distributable trust income.  26 U.S.C. §§ 641(b) (taxable income of trust 
shall be paid by fiduciary unless otherwise provided); 652 (inclusion of amounts in gross 
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fifty states actually tax trust income.160 
Flowing from Spivack’s liberal conception of property rights, her 
second important contribution to the discussion of trusts is her treatment of 
the split of legal and equitable title in family trusts as a mere formality, 
because “the reality in most family trusts like the one here is the sole 
purpose is to benefit the beneficiary, who is usually a child or grandchild of 
the grantor.”161  It is not obvious, however, why having a family member as 
a trust beneficiary nullifies any legal ownership or duties of the trustee.  
The beneficiaries’ rights that Spivack references (the right to be considered 
for an exercise of discretion, the right to demand an accounting, and the 
right to bring legal claims against the trustee) do not depend on or arise 
from the beneficiaries’ being strangers to the grantor.  The rights exist 
because of the title split, the legal relationship between the trustee and the 
beneficiaries.  It seems circular to cite the beneficiary’s informal exercise 
of one of her rights (Kaestner’s “complaining about the trust’s large legal 
expenses”) as evidence that the beneficiary was so deeply enmeshed in 
trust management that she should be treated as the owner of the property 
for tax purposes.162  True, Kaestner could (and did) borrow against trust 
property.163  But loans are not income for tax purposes because they are 
offset by corresponding obligations to repay.164  Only if one believes that 
the split between legal and equitable title is a mere formality, a sham, does 
one conclude that Kaestner would receive any property she requested from 
the trust and should be treated as its present owner for income tax 
purposes.165 
Spivack’s third major contribution to the discussion of trusts is her 
construction of existing state tax laws as having present authority to impose 
a tax on undistributed trust income, solely on the basis of a beneficiary’s 
residence in a jurisdiction.166  This view is a sort of variation on general 
 
income of beneficiaries of trusts distributing current income); 662 (inclusion of amounts in 
gross income of beneficiaries of trusts with distributable income).  But the grantor may 
specifically design the trust instrument to cause the trust income to be taxable to the grantor.  
26 U.S.C. §§ 671–684 (situations in which grantor or others will be treated as owner of trust 
income for income tax purposes).  
 160  See, e.g., NENNO, supra note 101. 
 161  Spivack, supra note 152, at 49 (referring to the “myth of the powerless beneficiary”). 
 162  Spivack, supra note 152, at 69. 
 163  Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 12-CVS-
8740, 2015 WL 1880607, at *2 (N.C. Super. Ct. 2015). 
 164  See, e.g., Cmm’r of Internal Revenue v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 493 U.S. 
203, 207–08 (1990) (citing basic principle of taxation that the “receipt of a loan is not 
income”). 
 165  Spivack, supra note 152, at 69 (“the record makes clear that Kimberley Kaestner 
understood she had access to the assets in the trust if she wanted them, for charitable or 
other purposes”). 
 166  Spivack, supra note 152, at 49 (urging the Supreme Court to “respect state taxing 
CRAWFORDCRAWFORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/14/2019  6:37 PM 
2019] MAGICAL THINKING AND TRUSTS 317 
jurisdiction jurisprudence: the determination that a person is domiciled in a 
state will mean that she and any property held in a family trust for her 
benefit will be subject to all of the state’s laws (including its tax laws).167  
Spivack’s construction of the tax law—although magical thinking, insofar 
as it is inconsistent with any actual state law168—flows directly from her 
broad concept of what it means to “benefit” from a trust.  She focuses on a 
beneficiary’s “property power,” defined as the beneficiary’s “chance to 
make choices and take opportunities that are unavailable to other 
people.”169  She goes on to say that Kaestner’s property power allowed her 
“to make different life choices,” such as not saving for “retirement, college 
tuition, illness, or job loss.”170 
And, in the event that property power is not a convincing enough 
basis for the imposition of tax on a beneficiary with undistributed trust 
income, Spivack also cites as evidence that Kaestner should be subject to 
income tax Kaestner’s alleged “power to decline distributions,”171 the fact 
that “[she] lived off the trust assets indirectly” while in North Carolina,172 
that she paid in-state tuition at a state university, and that she benefited 
from the state’s roads, police, and emergency response systems.173  If these 
 
authority”).  
 167  For a discussion of the difference between general jurisdiction and specific 
jurisdiction, see Crawford & Simon, supra note 145, at 14.  See also Philip S. Goldberg et 
al., The U.S. Supreme Court’s Personal Jurisdiction Paradigm Shift to End Litigation 
Tourism, 14 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 51 (2019); Todd David Peterson, Categorical 
Confusion in Personal Jurisdiction Law, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 655 (2019). 
 168  See, e.g., NENNO, supra note 101. 
 169  Spivack, supra note 152, at 49. 
 170  Spivack, supra note 152, at 62 (drawing on Justice Kagan’s line of questioning at 
oral argument). 
 171  Spivack, supra note 152, at 51.  Spivack does not cite to a particular source for this 
claim, but it may be that she is referring to Kaestner’s desire that the trust not terminate on 
her fortieth birthday.  See supra notes 118–119 and accompanying text.  The New York 
decanting statute specifically grants to the invaded trust’s beneficiaries the right to receive 
notice of the trustee’s exercising of a decanting power and standing to object to the 
decanting.  N.Y. EST. POWERS & TR. LAW § 10-6.6 (McKinney 2017).  Therefore, in most 
cases involving a competent beneficiary, it does not seem unreasonable for a trustee to 
discuss any decanting plans with the beneficiary and to consider any views expressed by the 
beneficiary, if for no reason other than to prepare for any possible objections.  See generally 
Mark S. Poker & Amy S. Kiiskila, Prevention and Resolution of Trust and Estate 
Controversies, 33 ACTEC J. 262 (2008) (describing strategies for fiduciary administration 
of trust and estates in a way that will minimize controversies with beneficiaries). 
 172  Spivack, supra note 152, at 57.  Spivack seems to support this claim of indirect profit 
from the trust assets because “the record contains no evidence” that Kaestner “worked at 
all.”  Id.  Even if Kaestner was not formally employed, her household may have had other 
income (i.e., her husband’s wealth or salary).  Furthermore, Kaestner did invest in some sort 
of commercial venture involving vanilla.  Bernstein Deposition, supra note 115, at *100.  
Whether it is fair to say that Kaestner herself, or the Kaestner household, did not contribute 
to the North Carolina economy, then, is unclear.  See id. 
 173  Spivack, supra note 152, at 62–63. 
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facts, taken together, were enough to cause Kaestner to be deemed a 
recipient of income from her trust, as Spivack believes they do, then North 
Carolina’s would be able to tax the value of those “distributions.”174 
There are multiple doctrinal obstacles to using either “property 
power” or the other referenced benefits as grounds for taxing a beneficiary 
like Kaestner, however.  First, the actual state law definition of trust 
income is narrow.175  “Income” for purposes of North Carolina trust law is 
“money or property” received by a fiduciary as “current return from a 
principal asset.”176  Property power—defined as the “chance to make 
choices”—and the ability to use roads or receive in-state tuition are not 
susceptible to entrustment and thus could not give rise to trust income.177 
Second, generally speaking the law does not tax a financially 
privileged person’s “ability to make choices” just because she has them and 
a less privileged person does not.  This makes common sense.  It is not 
obvious that Kaestner’s learning, at age thirty-seven, that she was the 
discretionary beneficiary of a thirteen million dollar trust caused her to 
make qualitatively different life choices (and there is no evidence to 
support such an assertion in this case).178  Even assuming that Kaestner had 
made certain financially-informed “life choices,” how might one begin to 
parse which of these were attributable to her specific knowledge that she 
was the discretionary beneficiary of this particular trust (and thus she 
should be taxed on its undistributed trust income)?  Kaestner’s decisions 
might have been motivated instead by general hopes and beliefs (if she had 
them) that she could rely on her father for lifetime gifts to meet her needs 
for tuition and illness-related expenses.179  Existing law does not tax the 
adult (or minor) children of wealthy individuals simply because they have 
more life choices than others do.  This is akin to the law’s egalitarian 
income treatment of taxpayers without regard to their educational 
backgrounds.  That is, the law does not impose an income tax on someone 
who receives her degree at an elite institution as opposed to a community 
 
 174  See generally Maguire, supra note 142, at 16–17 (state taxation of actual distribution 
of trust income is valid as a matter of due process). 
 175  See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 37A-1-102(4) (West 2018) (adopting Uniform Principal 
and Income Act, including definition of trust income as “money or property that a fiduciary 
receives as current return from a principal asset”). 
 176  Id. 
 177  See supra notes 169–170 and accompanying text (defining “property power”). 
 178  See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 179  Such direct payments of tuition or medical expenses would, in fact, be consistent 
with sound estate planning, insofar as the transfers are not subject to the gift tax under 26 
U.S.C. § 2503(e) (excluding from definition of taxable gifts transfer that otherwise meet the 
requirements of a “qualified transfer” to certain educational institutions or as payment for 
medical care).  See also Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-6 (2018) (further defining “qualified 
transfer” for purposes of IRC § 2503). 
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college, for example, even though the former likely will have more (or 
more lucrative) employment choices than will the latter.180  Freedom and 
choice—a kind of subjective mental state combined with actual or 
perceived personal well-being or comfort—are not generally subject to 
income taxation.181 
A third challenge to Spivack’s expansive approach to taxation is the 
“minimum contacts” standard of International Shoe, which suggests that 
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” would not be met 
by a beneficiary’s use of roads and the potential availability to her of public 
safety and health services.182  Otherwise, even the casual out-of-state 
traveler driving on North Carolina roads could expect to owe income tax on 
the fraction of her salary from employment, say, that accrues while the 
traveler uses a vacation day to travel through North Carolina to the state of 
her final destination.  So Spivack’s expansive definition of trust income is 
untethered from the actual statutes, case law, or precedent.  Even so, the 
conceptual possibility that a broader range of benefits could be defined as 
trust income forces any dialogue about trusts and taxation to confront the 
questions about the purpose and implementation of any state income tax 
regime. 
B.  The Institutional Approach 
Like Professor Spivack, Professor Hemel is skeptical that family trusts 
are truly arm’s length arrangements.  But where Spivack sees a Court that 
is duped by trusts’ “sleight of hand,”183 Hemel sees a Court that knows 
exactly what it is doing in declaring North Carolina’s tax unconstitutional 
in Kaestner Trust.184  In an essay published the day after the Court’s 
 
 180  See generally, e.g., Kathleen Elkins, The 25 Colleges Where Students Go On to Earn 
the Most Money, CNBC (May 1, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/01/the-colleges-
where-students-go-on-to-earn-the-most-money.html (listing among schools that produce 
highest-earning graduates the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Harvard University, 
Georgetown and Stanford University); Nick Morrison, World Rankings Show the Best 
Universities for Getting a Job, FORBES (Nov. 23, 2016, 6:16 AM), https://www.forbes.com 
/sites/nickmorrison/2016/11/23/world-rankings-show-the-best-universities-for-getting-a-
job/#3829dfc74879 (evaluating employment statistics from 300 universities and listing 
among schools whose graduates are most “appealing” to employers as Stanford University, 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Columbia University and Princeton University). 
 181  See, e.g., Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Equity, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1238 (2008) 
(explaining in discussion of social stigmas against LGBT individuals and associated 
emotional or mental stress or disorders, “as a natural corollary of its inability to account for 
‘psychic’ income, the income tax does not allow for any sort of a ‘psychic’ deduction to 
account for the negative mental health effects of discrimination”). 
 182  Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 183  See Spivack supra note 152, at 68–69. 
 184  N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr., 139 S. Ct. 2213 
(2019).  See Daniel Hemel, A Constitutional Right to Skirt State Income Tax?, MEDIUM 
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decision, Hemel quipped, “It’s a pity that Supreme Court opinions don’t 
come with emojis, because this [opinion] just calls out for the winking 
face.”185  He criticizes Justice Sotomayor’s opinion for overreliance on the 
trustee’s discretion, pointing, as Spivack does, to the grantor’s direction 
that the trustee should treat the trust as a “family asset,” and make trust 
distributions for the beneficiaries’ milestone expenses like education, a 
home purchase, and starting a business.186  Hemel calls Sotomayor’s 
reasoning “formalism at its acme,” because “we all know” that the trustee 
will make whatever distributions the grantor and the beneficiaries want.187 
Unlike Spivack, Hemel focuses on the decision itself to raise 
questions pertinent to fundamental constitutional doctrine—the 
“institution” of constitutional law—as well as the larger tax law structure—
the “institution” of tax administration.  For example, Hemel rhetorically 
questions who (or what) suffers from a violation of the Due Process Clause 
if North Carolina imposes a tax solely on the basis of a trust beneficiary’s 
in-state residence: “Who exactly is suffering the due process violation 
here?  The court doesn’t bother to say.”188  Pregnant in this question is the 
possibility that Hemel suspects that trusts do not have due process rights, 
or, if they do, those rights are somehow different (if not less than) the due 
process rights afforded to individuals or corporations.189  If so, that would 
represent a substantial development in constitutional law doctrine,190 and 
 
(June 22, 2019), https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/a-constitutional-right-to-
skirt-state-income-tax-605dc8c42fbc. 
 185  Hemel, supra note 184. 
 186  See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 187  Hemel, supra note 184. 
 188  Id.  Later in the essay, Hemel asks whether the due process rights belong to the 
trustee or the beneficiaries.  Id.  This seems to be a distinction without a difference.  
Compare Bridget J. Crawford (@ProfBCrawford), TWITTER (June 21, 2019, 1:28 PM), 
https://twitter.com/ProfBCrawford/status/1142167341352062982 (“State tax laws must 
meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.  Who was North 
Carolina trying to tax?  The trust. Non-grantor irrevocable trusts are distinct taxpaying 
entities for state and fed purposes.  No news there.”) with Daniel J. Hemel 
(@DanielJHemel), TWITTER (June 21, 2019, 1:37 PM) https://twitter.com/DanielJHemel/sta 
tus/1142169768499306497 (“So it was the irrevocable trust’s due process rights that were 
being violated?  (The fact that they are distinct taxpaying entities is not the same as saying 
they are persons for purposes of the due process clause.)”) and Bridget J. Crawford 
(@ProfBCrawford), TWITTER (June 21, 2019, 1:41PM), https://twitter.com/ProfBCrawford/ 
status/1142170727002624000 (“‘Person’ vs non-person does no work in this argument.  Is 
there a sufficient degree of enjoyment, etc. by beneficiary to permit trust to be taxed?  The 
system must meet requirements of due process.  Any person or entity subject to taxation has 
right to due process.”) 
 189  An individual defendant domiciled in a state can be haled into courts there.  See 
generally Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014).  A corporate defendant 
incorporated in a state or doing business in that state are subject to the jurisdiction of courts 
there, too.  See generally id. 
 190  See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 596 F. Supp. 2d 661 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) 
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Hemel rightfully wishes the court had been clearer on this point. 
Hemel’s general skepticism about family trusts leads to bleak 
predictions about the impacts of the Court’s decision.  He forecasts that 
states that presently do impose income tax on trusts will need to experiment 
with a variety of tax options, such as new gift taxes or an imperfect throw-
back tax on trust income.191  Hemel’s concerns about the tax landscape are 
grounded in the practical (he touches on the complexity of a throw-back 
tax).  He further warns that Sotomayor’s opinion provides a blueprint for 
future strategic behavior by taxpayers: 
If you’re a rich person in a high-tax state, the path forward is 
quite clear.  Transfer income-generating assets to an irrevocable 
trust in a state that does not tax trust income on the basis of 
trustee residence or place of administration. . . .  [I]ncome 
generated by the trust now lies beyond the reach of tax 
authorities in your home state.  Choose a reputable trustee and 
give her nominal discretion over the timing of distributions. . . .  
[T]he income generated by the trust lies beyond the reach of tax 
authorities in your beneficiary’s home state too.192 
Practically speaking, however, the nature of the federal system is that each 
state is free to structure its laws, including its tax laws, in any way that it 
chooses, as long as those laws do not conflict with the U.S. Constitution.193  
In such a system, it is inevitable that wealthy (and even less wealthy) 
individuals will exploit differences in state tax laws so as to minimize, or 
even avoid, taxation.194  There seems to be a general tolerance for taxpayers 
 
(recognizing due process rights for an individual in state taxation matter); Borden Chemicals 
and Plastics, L.P. v. Zehnder, 726 N.E.2d 73 (Ill. App. 2000) (recognizing due process 
rights for a partnership’s out-of-state partner in a state taxation matters); Dept. of Revenue 
v. GAP (Apparel), Inc., 886 So. 2d 459 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (recognizing due process rights 
for an intangible holding company in a state taxation matters); Am. Chicle Co. v. State Tax 
Comm’n, 11 A.D.2d 256 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960) (recognizing due process rights of a 
corporation in a state taxation matter). 
 191  Hemel, supra note 184. 
 192  Id. at 
 193  See, e.g., Bell’s Gap R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 237 (1890) (Nothing 
prevents a state “from adjusting its system of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways.  It 
may, if it chooses, exempt certain classes of property from any taxation at all . . .  All such 
regulations, and those of like character, so long as they proceed within reasonable limits and 
general usage, are within the discretion of the state legislature, or the people of the State in 
framing their Constitution.”).  See also Gerald L. Neuman, Equal Protection, “General 
Equality” and Economic Discrimination from a U.S. Perspective, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 281, 
300–08 (1999) (discussing constitutional limitations on differences in U.S. state tax 
systems). 
 194  Tax-motivated domicile changes are the topic of many publicly available articles 
written for the general public.  See, e.g., Julie Garber, 5 Good Reason to Become a Florida 
Resident, BALANCE (May 20, 2019), https://www.thebalance.com/top-reasons-to-become-a-
florida-resident-3505072 (stating that combined state income tax and estate tax rates “can 
provide a huge incentive for individuals to look for a more desirable and less taxing place to 
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who cross state lines to buy tax-free liquor, for example,195 and those 
retirees who move to states with low (or no) income or estate taxes.196  
What is important about Hemel’s contribution, then, is that it provides an 
example of the strong negative reaction to similar tax-motivated behavior, 
when undertaken by wealthy individuals who create family trusts.197  The 
strength of that reaction suggests an underlying moral or philosophical 
dimension to the critique.198  Tax and trust scholars may turn more 
explicitly to moral and philosophical concerns in future work.199 
Hemel ends his essay with distinct awareness of the expressive value 
of Supreme Court opinions.  He describes Kaestner Trust as a ruling that 
will cause more than lost revenue for North Carolina and other states: 
Will [Kaestner Trust] go down as part of the anti-canon of the 
worst Supreme Court decisions ever?  Of course not.  But when 
the history of our second Gilded Age is written, Kaestner will 
warrant a plaintive footnote—an illustration that in an era of 
already-too-wide wealth inequality, concerns about high-end tax 
 
call home like Florida,” and explaining that Florida has no income tax, no estate tax and a 
generous homestead exemption”). 
 195  See, e.g., Kara Newman, How New Hampshire’s Liquor Stores Became Must-Visit 
Travel Destinations, SEVEN FIFTY DAILY (Dec. 18, 2017), https://daily.sevenfifty.com/how-
new-hampshires-liquor-stores-became-must-visit-travel-destinations/ (“New Hampshire is 
also the only control state that operates liquor stores—and sells that liquor tax free.  That 
means that New Hampshire draws a significant amount of out-of-state business.  It’s an 
unusual business model.  More than half of sales at these gargantuan retailers comes from 
out-of-state-customers. . . .”). 
 196  Compare, e.g., Sandra Block et al., 10 Most Tax-Friendly States for Retirees, 2018, 
KIPLINGER (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.kiplinger.com/slideshow/retirement/T037-S001-
10-most-tax-friendly-states-for-retirees-2018/index.html (ranking Alaska as the most “tax-
friendly state” for retirees because of absence of state income tax and estate tax and low 
state and local sales tax rates), with The Top 10 Most Tax-Friendly States for Retirement, 
RETIREMENT LIVING (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.retirementliving.com/top-10-most-tax-
friendly-states (ranking Wyoming as the most “tax-friendly state” for retirees because of the 
absence of state income and estate tax, low state and local sales tax rates, and low gas tax 
rates). 
 197  See Hemel, supra note 184. 
 198  See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text. 
 199  For excellent extant work exploring philosophical perspectives in wealth transfers, 
see, e.g., Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Why Tax Wealth Transfers: A Philosophical Analysis, 57 
B.C. L. REV. 859 (2016); Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Utilitarianism and Wealth Transfer 
Taxation, 69 ARK. L. REV. 695 (2016); Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Unseating Privilege: Rawls, 
Equality of Opportunity, and Wealth Transfer Taxation, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 713 (2013); 
Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Death, Taxes, and Property (Rights): Nozick, Libertarianism, and the 
Estate Tax, 66 ME. L. REV. 1 (2013); Miranda Perry Fleischer, Libertarianism and the 
Charitable Tax Subsidies, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1345 (2015); Miranda Perry Fleischer, 
Charitable Giving and Utilitarianism: Problems and Priorities, 89 IND. L.J. 1485 (2014); 
Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The Role of Distributive 
Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505 (2010). 
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avoidance elicited from the justices little more than a shrug.200 
The image of the justices giving “little more than a shrug” in response to 
behavior that helps rich people stay that way is profoundly evocative.  In 
reading Hemel’s description of the present era “our second Gilded Age,” 
one immediately recalls that the wealth gap in 2012 was not that different 
from the wealth gap just before the great stock market crash in 1929, and 
that the wealth gap has widened since 2012.201  Hemel appreciates both the 
historical context of the Court’s decision and present-day wealth 
inequalities.202  For both Hemel and Spivack, then, the Kaestner Trust 
decision represents the Court’s missed opportunity to do justice.203  
Although neither Spivack nor Hemel implies that the judiciary should be 
the primary instrument for dismantling complex systems of wealth 
inequality, both believe that the Court has a role to play and that it failed to 
do its duty in this case. 
C.  Themes in Critical Academic Analyses of Trusts 
Like Spivack and Hemel, most academics tend to be critical of family 
trusts.  There seems to be a general distaste for transfers of “partial bundles 
of sticks” to trustees for beneficiaries who otherwise possess the full legal 
capacity to own property.204  The concerns tend to cluster into three general 
categories: taxes, control, and accountability. 
Critics’ tax concerns manifest in noting that, with careful planning, 
legal and equitable title split might result in trust assets being subject to no 
income tax at all.205  Furthermore, trusts unconstrained by the rule against 
perpetuities can escape the estate tax entirely.206  This runs counter to the 
intuition that all property belongs to someone, and thus should be 
susceptible to taxation at all points in time.207 
 
 200  Hemel, supra note 184. 
 201  See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.  
 202  See supra Part II.A. 
 203  See Spivack, supra note 152, at 68–69; Hemel, supra note 184 and accompanying 
text. 
 204  See, e.g., Bridget J. Crawford, Who Is Afraid of Perpetual Trusts?, 111 MICH. L. 
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 79, 79 (2012) (“Throw a stone into a room full of law professors, 
and it is virtually impossible to hit someone who will defend perpetual trusts.”).  
 205  See Hemel, supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
 206  See, e.g., Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 
UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1342 (2003) (explaining how perpetual trusts are not subject to estate 
taxation); Jeramie J. Fortenberry, Use Dynasty Trusts for Multigenerational Wealth 
Transfers, 44 EST. PLAN. 35 (2017) (providing overview of dynasty trusts).  See also Jay A. 
Soled, Reimagining the Estate Tax in the Automation Era, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 787, 820–
21 (explaining objections to so-called perpetual trusts as relating to opportunities for 
“taxpayer exploitation” and tax avoidance). 
 207  See Jacques, supra note 8 (explaining the “liberal understanding of private property” 
as having a political dimension, characterized by the belief that “people have an equal right 
CRAWFORD (DO NOT DELETE) 11/14/2019  6:37 PM 
324 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:289 
Control concerns stem from multiple aspects of substantive trust law.  
One strain of critique evocatively focuses on the need for time limits on 
“dead hand control” by a grantor long gone.208  Some period of time in 
which a grantor’s wishes may govern trust property seems to be acceptable.  
That time period typically is the common law perpetuities period that law 
students and scholars have come to grudgingly accept as justified (with the 
traditional rationale that a property owner rightfully may condition the use 
of property for those he knows personally—typically his children and their 
children—but the control must end after the infamous period of lives in 
being plus twenty-one years).209 
The other strain of the control critique, raised separately or together 
with first, is that family trusts are somehow not “real.”  The argument is 
that any legal and equitable title split in a family trust is illusory, and the 
trustee is a mere (paper) figure-head who poses no meaningful obstacle to 
the beneficiary’s enjoyment of the trust property.210  The flipside of this 
critique relies on an opposite view on the trustee, one that emphasizes the 
trustee’s power, not the trustee’s de facto impotence when presented with 
the wishes of the grantor or beneficiaries.211  Consider in particular that 
under a state’s decanting statute, trustees may have the ability change the 
situs, term or beneficial interest in trusts by exercise of their decanting 
 
to pursue their aims in life, from which follows a corresponding equal right to acquire the 
resources that will enable them to pursue these aims,” as well as the legal dimension driven 
by “the right to control things in accordance with one’s interests as well as the right to deny 
others the use of these things” in furtherance of individual autonomy). 
 208  See, e.g., Ray Madoff, America Builds an Aristocracy, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2010), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/12/opinion/12madoff.html (critiquing long-term trusts as 
contributing to inappropriate preservation of wealth).  
 209  In adjudicating the dispute in the Duke of Norfolk’s Case, (1682) 22 Eng. Rep. 931 
(Ch.); 3 Chan. Cas.1, the judge recognized the right of the pater familias to make decisions 
regarding the transmission of some, all or no property rights to those he knew.  Id.  The 
English lawyer and judge Arthur Hobhouse, First Baron Hobhouse, famously wrote that, “A 
clear, obvious, natural line is drawn for us between those persons and events which the 
Settlor knows and sees, and those which he cannot know or see.  Within the former province 
we may trust his natural affections and his capacity of judgment to make better dispositions 
than any external Law . . . .”  Arthur Hobhouse, The Devolution and Transfer of Land, in 
THE DEAD HAND: ADDRESSES ON THE SUBJECT OF ENDOWMENTS AND SETTLEMENTS OF 
PROPERTY 188 (1880).  For a contemporary critique of perpetual trusts, see, e.g., Mark L. 
Ascher, But I Thought the Earth Belonged to the Living, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1149, 1160 (2011) 
(calling long-term trusts “loony”). 
 210  See, e.g., Cmm’r of Internal Revenue v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 493 U.S. 
203, 207–08 (1990); Spivak supra note 152, at 49; Hemel, supra note 184 and 
accompanying text. 
 211  See Weisbord, supra note 72 (exploring the contours and limitations of a trustee’s 
decanting powers); Alex Boni-Saenz, Baselines in Trust Term Extensions, 67 FLA. L. REV. 
F. 30 (2015) (calling trustees’ exercise of decanting power to extend duration of trust “the 
next battleground in the rancorous war over the Rule Against Perpetuities”). 
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powers.212  This powerful trustee is quite the opposite of trustee-as-
figurehead.  In this view, the trustee plays a highly determinative role in 
shaping beneficial interests.213 
Commentators’ accountability concerns center on the rights of third 
parties.  Spendthrift trusts, critics claim, allow beneficiaries to behave 
irresponsibly without financial consequences, because they become 
judgment-proof against claims by tort victims or other creditors, like 
divorcing spouses.214  Critics reserve particular distaste for self-settled asset 
protection trusts created in U.S. jurisdictions; they do so without full 
practical appreciation for the attractiveness of offshore jurisdictions, not to 
mention potential lost tax revenue, if such trusts became unavailable in this 
country.215 
One nineteenth century Pennsylvania judge opined that, “Whoever 
has the right to give, has the right to dispose of the same as he pleases.”216  
One predicts that most academics would agree, in the sense that any 
individual property owner has the authority to choose the individual 
recipient of a post-mortem gift of a particular heirloom, for example, or 
that the owner could choose to destroy the heirloom during her lifetime if 
she so desires.  But when evaluating transfers to a trust for oneself or one’s 
family members, there is little tolerance for arrangements that result in no 
liability for income or estate tax,217 limited (or no) liability for bad acts,218 
or limitations on a jurisdiction’s ability to hale a trust grantor or beneficiary 
into court, if either of them has any contact of any level with the forum 
state.219 
 
 212  See, e.g., Weisbord, supra note 72, at 76. 
 213  See, e.g., id. 
 214  See, e.g., Spivack, supra note 152, at 48–49, 64–67 (describing cases in which trust 
spendthrift clauses deny divorcing spouse the ability to reach assets in trust). 
 215  See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the 
Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035 (2000) (calling repeal of rule against perpetuities a 
“race to the bottom”).  Cf. Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking the Law of Creditors’ Rights in 
Trusts, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 287 (2002) (articulating possible argument in favor of the self-
settled asset protection trust in terms of the creditors of a trust grantor having no more right 
to reach trust property than the grantor could).  
 216  It sounds better in Latin: “Cujus est dare ejus est disponere.”  Ashhurst v. Given, 5 
Watts & Serg. 323, 330 (Pa. 1843) (disallowing creditors to reach beneficiary’s interest in 
trust based on restrictions placed by grantor).  
 217  See, e.g., supra note 153 and accompanying text; supra note 207 and accompanying 
text; N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr., 139 S. Ct. 2213 
(2019).  
 218  See, e.g., supra notes 214–215 and accompanying text. 
 219  See, e.g., supra note 166–174 and accompanying text. 
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V.  COURTS, TAXES, AND WEALTH CONCENTRATIONS 
A.  Courts Cannot Solve the Problem of Wealth Inequality 
Particularly for wealthy taxpayers, the tax system in the United States 
is a cat-and-mouse game.220  The system’s foundations are state and federal 
laws (and sometimes local laws, too, as in the case of sales tax), amplified 
by the regulations that purport to interpret those laws.221  For most income, 
estate, and gift taxes, a taxpayer self-reports the amount of tax owed, and 
the government can either accept or reject the return.222  If a conflict arises 
between a taxpayer and the government that cannot be resolved 
administratively, then a judge will be called upon to interpret and apply the 
applicable tax laws in order to end the dispute.223  But courts lack the power 
to change the tax laws, unless the laws violate the applicable state 
constitution or the U.S. Constitution.224  Until now, critics of the state 
 
 220  The vivid (and accurate) description does not originate here; multiple other scholars 
and commentators have deployed the metaphor.  See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, The 
Loophole Artist, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2003), https://nyti.ms/2UUxxMQ (“[The tax] cat-
and-mouse game is to work the loopholes in the system until the government finds them and 
draws them closed.”); Jay A. Soled & Mitchell Gans, Related Parties and the Need to 
Bridge the Gap Between the Income Tax and Transfer Tax Systems, 62 ALA. L. REV. 405, 
438 (2011) (“Congress should not approach transfer tax reform in a piecemeal fashion . . . 
this cat-chasing-mouse process will only result in frustration as clever taxpayers and their 
undaunted advisers will continue to formulate and develop new transfer tax-saving 
methodologies.”); George K. Yin, Reforming (and Saving) the IRS by Respecting the 
Public’s Right to Know, 100 VA. L. REV. 1115, 1155 (2014) (“Since enforcement of the tax 
laws is to some extent a cat-and-mouse game, the agency’s ability to use its limited 
enforcement resources most efficiently must be preserved.”). 
 221  See, e.g., Bridget J. Crawford & Carla Spivack, Tampon Taxes, Discrimination and 
Human Rights, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 491, 500 (discussing sales tax-free status of medical 
supplies and necessities).  See also, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 212.08(nnn) (2018) (providing sales 
tax exemption for “products used to absorb menstrual flow” defined as “products used to 
absorb or contain menstrual flow, including, but not limited to, tampons, sanitary napkins, 
pantiliners, and menstrual cups”). 
 222  For a brief overview of federal income tax procedure, see NEWMAN ET AL., FEDERAL 
INCOME TAXATION: CASES, PROBLEMS & MATERIALS 9–10 (7th ed. 2019). 
 223  Id. (describing judicial pathways of a federal income tax case). 
 224  Relevant limitations in the U.S. Constitution include, for example, the Due Process 
Clause and the Commerce Clause.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (prohibiting state from 
state depriving any person “of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”); U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8 (reserving to Congress the right to regulate commerce “among the several 
states”).  Although some provisions of state constitutions may mirror, overlap with, or be 
interpreted similarly to their federal counterparts, that is not always true.  See, e.g., Aileen 
H. Char Life Interest v. Maricopa County, 93 P.3d 486 (Ariz. 2004) (interpreting the state 
constitution’s Uniformity Clause, Ariz. Const. art. IX, § 1, to provide taxpayers with greater 
protection than the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution).  Also, distinguish between a court’s ability to declare that a law is 
unconstitutional (i.e., unenforceable) with the ability to change the law.  See, e.g., Eric S. 
Fish, Choosing Constitutional Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 322, 324–25, 380–81 (2016) 
(distinguishing between declaring law unconstitutional versus changing legislative content, 
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income taxation of trusts, or even trusts in general, have tended to use 
scholarly articles and amicus briefs to make technical arguments against 
family trusts.225  But if loopholes in state laws permit family trusts to 
flourish inappropriately, state legislatures, not the courts, are likely the 
most effective source of reform.226 
At their core, trusts are creations of legal fiction, to be sure.227  But 
legal decisions over centuries have recognized trusts, including their split 
of legal and equitable title, as valid.228  To the extent that trust law has 
changed dramatically in the last twenty-five years, the transformation is the 
result of state-by-state legislation.229  Proposals for reform have come from 
national organizations such as the American Law Institute and the Uniform 
Law Commission, as well as individuals and groups—typically local 
lawyers, bankers, and their professional associations—in each state.230  As 
 
while also noting that “in cases where the existing law is unconstitutional, the court must 
generally make a change that will either expand or contract the law”).  See also Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Address, Some Thoughts on Judicial Authority to Repair Unconstitutional 
Legislation, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 301, 317 (1979) (“When the court passes on the 
constitutionality of a statute . . . it concludes its essentially judicial business. If it declares 
the statute unconstitutional as written, the remaining task is essentially legislative.”). 
 225  See supra notes 149–150 and accompanying text and supra Parts IV.A and B. 
 226  Undoubtedly, the focus on the production of scholarly articles makes sense, given 
that most tenured and tenure-track faculty members are expected to produce scholarship as 
part of their jobs.  See, e.g., College of Law Tenure Standards and Procedures, UNIVERSITY 
OF IOWA COLLEGE OF LAW (2009), https://uiowa.edu/conflictmanagement/sites/uiowa.edu.co 
nflictmanagement/files/Law.pdf (“[E]very faculty member is expected to engage in the 
study of and critical evaluation of some aspects of the legal system. It is also expected that 
the fruits of this inquiry will result in scholarly publications.”).  Furthermore, one suspects 
that there are far more law professors who are familiar with amicus briefs (from their 
experiences as judicial clerks) than there are law professors who have experience with state 
or federal legislative lobbying.  See, e.g, Sarah Lawsky, Spring Self-Reported Entry Level 
Hiring Report 2019, PRAWFSBLAWG (June 4, 2019), https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsbl 
awg/2019/06/spring-self-reported-entry-level-hiring-report-2019.html (showing 63% of all 
self-reported recent law school faculty hires held a clerkship prior to accepting their faculty 
position, but not gathering data about legislative lobbying experience).  This is not to say 
that law faculty are not involved at the state or national levels on law reform projects.  See, 
e.g., Electronic Wills Act, Draft for Discussion, UNIF. LAW COMM’N (Feb. 12, 2019), 
https://tinyurl.com/y3pufoj5 (listing Professor Susan Gary of the University of Oregon 
School of Law as the Committee’s Reporter).  
 227  See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 228  See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text. 
 229  See Crawford, supra note 13, at 81–82 (“In the case of trusts that are designed to 
keep rich people rich, three very curious things have happened in the United States in the 
last twenty-five years.  These have revolutionized trust law more than anything else in the 
last 400 years: the rise of self-settled asset protection trusts, the proliferation of trust 
decanting rules and the repeal of the rule against perpetuities in over half of the jurisdictions 
in the nation.”) (citations omitted). 
 230  This is what Robert Sitkoff calls the “top-down versus bottom-up” model of reform, 
with proposals from American Law Institute and the Uniform Law Commission typically 
intended “to update the law in accord with emerging academic and elite practitioner policy 
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with state income tax laws, once the legislature enacts a provision, 
generally speaking a court must find a violation of the state constitution, 
the U.S. Constitution, or perhaps public policy, in order to change it.231  For 
that reason, courts are ill-equipped to play a role in dismantling wealth 
inequality through interpretation of income tax laws or trust laws. 
B.  Taxes Could Solve the Problem of Wealth Inequality 
Given the wealth inequality in this country, one naturally turns to the 
estate tax as a possible remedy.  After all, Congress enacted the estate tax 
in 1916,232 motivated by the need to raise revenue during the first world 
war and to address rising wealth inequality.233  Unfortunately, however, the 
country’s past and existing iterations of the estate tax have never raised 
much revenue.234  In 2018, estate tax collections represented approximately 
 
consensus on necessary revision to the canon.”  Robert Sitkoff, Top-Down Versus Bottom-
Up Law Reform in Trusts and Estates: Future Interests and Perpetuities, JOTWELL (Nov. 22, 
2010), https://trustest.jotwell.com/top-down-versus-bottom-up-law-reform-in-trusts-and-
estates-future-interests-and-perpetuities.  In contrast, “the other law reform pattern, which 
we can characterize as bottom-up, local bankers and lawyers lobby state lawmakers for a 
specific reform. Bottom-up reforms are usually meant to attract trust business (think 
perpetual or asset protection trusts).”  Id. 
 231  There are, of course, exceptions to this general rule, although arguably courts 
accomplish legal change by choosing to follow or depart from case law precedent 
interpreting a statute, rather than attacking the statute itself.  See, e.g., Sullivan v. Burkin, 
460 N.E.2d 572 (Mass. 1984).  In that case, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
addressed the question of whether a revocable inter vivos trust created by a husband was 
subject to the widow’s elective share right.  Id.  A prior decision had interpreted the elective 
share statute to apply to only probate property.  See Kerwin v. Donaghy, 59 N.E.2d 299 
(Mass. 1945).  In Sullivan, the court announced that “for the future . . . as to any inter vivos 
trust created or amended after the date of this opinion, we shall no longer follow the rule 
announced in Kerwin v. Donaghy.”  Sullivan, 460 N.E.2d at 577.  Practically speaking, that 
meant that the court prospectively expanded the elective share right of a surviving spouse, 
even though the statute did not change.  See id. 
 232  An Act to Increase the Revenue, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 64-271, § 1, 39 
Stat. 756, 756–57 (1916). 
 233  See Jeffrey A. Cooper, The Ghosts of 1932: The Lost History of Estate and Gift 
Taxation, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 875, 882 (2010) (“In 1916, Congress again turned to estate taxes 
to fund another looming military conflict, enacting a new estate tax just prior to U.S. entry 
into World War I.”); WILLIAM H. GATES, SR. & CHUCK COLLINS, WEALTH AND OUR 
COMMONWEALTH: WHY AMERICA SHOULD TAX ACCUMULATED FORTUNES 41 (2002) (“Early 
in the twentieth century, Gilded Age corruption and inequality, powerful and popular social 
movements, and growing moral misgivings within the wealthy elite all converged on 
America’s political stage.  Out of that convergence came America’s first lasting estate 
tax.”); PIKETTY, supra note 38, at 440 (“[T]his fear of growing to resemble Europe was part 
of the reason why the United States in 1910–1920 pioneered a very progressive estate tax on 
large fortunes, which were deemed to be incompatible with US values . . . .”). 
 234  See generally James R. Repetti, Should We Tax the Gratuitous Transfer of Wealth? 
An Introduction, 57 B.C. L. REV. 815, 815 (2016) (reporting on comparative percentages of 
total tax revenue attributable to the estate tax for the period 1981 through 2014 ranging from 
an approximate high of 1.2% to a low 0.65%).   
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0.65% of total tax revenue.235  Given the generous wealth transfer tax 
exemption (in 2019, $11.4 million per person or $22.8 million per 
couple),236 the number of estates subject to taxation is necessarily small.237 
The current wealth transfer framework of high exemptions and 
relatively low tax rates has not been constant throughout the estate tax’s 
history, however.238  For example, for the period September 1, 1936 
through June 25, 1945, net estates valued at more than ten million dollars 
were subject to taxation at a rate of seventy percent.239  For the period 1977 
through 1981, that same top rate of seventy percent applied to estates 
valued at more five million dollars.240  Only after President George W. 
Bush signed into law the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation 
Act of 2001 did estate tax rates start steadily declining substantially 
downward, while the wealth transfer tax exemption amount trended 
steadily upward.241 
Although there is historical precedent for higher rates of taxation,242 
making only modifications to rates or exemptions may not be enough to 
make a meaningful change to the wealth gap.  France, for example, has a 
more robust estate tax system than the United States does, with a top rate of 
forty-five percent.243  In France, the rate of wealth inequality is still high 
 
 235  See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. DATA BOOK 2018, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 14, 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/18databk.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2019) (see Table 6). 
 236  See Rev. Proc. 2018-57 (announcing inflation-adjusted figures applicable for tax 
year 2019); 26 U.S.C. § 2010(c) (2018), amended by Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. 
No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (increasing wealth transfer tax exemption in 2018 to $11.18 per 
person, indexed for inflation). 
 237  Compare INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. DATA BOOK 2018, supra note 235, at Table 2 
(showing 34,092 estate tax returns filed for 2018) with INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. DATA 
BOOK 2009, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/09databk.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2019) (see Table 2) (showing 46,000 estate tax returns filed for 2009).  
Practically speaking, the high exemptions mean that only approximately 0.1% of decedents’ 
estates are subject to estate taxation each year.  See, e.g., Julie Garber, Federal Estate Tax 
Exemptions 1997 Through 2019, BALANCE (July 9, 2019), https://www.thebalance.com/exe 
mption-from-federal-estate-taxes-3505630 (providing overview of operation and amount of 
exemption from federal estate and gift taxes). 
 238  See supra note 236 and accompanying text (furnishing wealth transfer tax exemption 
figures for 2019 of $11.4 million per individual and $22.8 million for per married couple). 
 239  See, e.g., A Historical Look at Estate and Gift Tax Rates, CCH, 
https://www.cch.com/press/news/historicalestategifttaxrates.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2019) 
(providing maximum estate tax rates for years 1916 through 2011). 
 240  Id. at  
 241  H.R. 1836, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001). 
 242  See supra note 236 and accompanying text; supra note 238 and accompanying text; 
supra note 239 and accompanying text. 
 243  See, e.g., Alan Cole, Estate and Inheritance Taxes Around the World, TAX FOUND. 
(2015), https://taxfoundation.org/estate-and-inheritance-taxes-around-world (providing data 
on highest estate and inheritance tax rates in thirty-four countries); Jean-Marc Tirard & 
Maryse Naudin, Private Client Law in France: Overview, WESTLAW.COM (Dec. 1, 2017), 
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(although lower than the rate of inequality in the United States), with the 
top ten percent of all households owning approximately sixty-two percent 
of all of the country’s wealth.244  This suggests that higher tax rates do have 
some impact on wealth inequality, but query how high the rate would have 
to go (and how low the exemption would need to be set) to see similar (or 
better) results in the United States compared to France, for example.245 
Even short of imposing estate tax at near-confiscatory rates, it is far 
from obvious that the majority of the American electorate would support 
broad-reaching changes to the present system of taxing transfers of wealth 
during lifetime or at death.246  According to a recent poll conducted for the 
New York Times, two-thirds of all Americans (including fifty-five percent 
of self-identified Republicans and sixty-six percent of self-identified 
Independents) support a two percent tax on households having more than 
fifty million dollars of wealth.247  At the same time, however, rank-and-file 
Democratic voters express concern that sweeping change, like the wealth 
tax they overwhelmingly support when polled, might not be practical.  
Some of these voters report that they worry that proposals like the two 
percent wealth tax are too “radical” to receive support in the general 
election, and that in order to increase the chance that a Democrat will be 
elected as President, any candidate should take a more incremental 
approach to tax (and other) reform.248 
If significant estate tax reform or a wealth taxes are not viable near-
term strategies for combatting wealth inequality, consider instead the 
 
https://tinyurl.com/y6zjfkoj (providing overview of taxes in inheritances and lifetime 
transfers); Jacques, supra note 8. 
 244  PIKETTY, supra note 38, at 430 (showing historic changes in top decile’s share of 
country’s total wealth). 
 245  Professor Jim Repetti suggests that it is far from obvious that any version of the U.S. 
estate tax system has, in fact, been effective in breaking up concentrations of wealth.  See, 
e.g., Repetti, supra note 234 (reporting low percentages of revenue generated by estate tax). 
 246  See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE 
FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 6–7 (2006) (describing inaccurate yet effective 
deployment of the phrase “death tax” in marshalling opposition to the estate tax). 
 247  See, e.g., Jim Tankersley & Benn Casselman, Wealth Tax and Free College Get Poll 
Support, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2YYTCwh (showing overall support 
for the wealth tax at a rate of sixty-sixty percent, with the level of support among self-
identified Democrats at eighty-one percent).  See also Matthew Yglesias, Elizabeth 
Warren’s Proposed Tax on Enormous Fortunes, Explained, VOX (Jan. 24, 2019), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/1/24/18196275/elizabeth-warren-wealth-tax 
(describing for a general audience Senator Warren’s proposal for a 2% tax on households 
with over fifty million dollars in wealth, projected to raise $2.75 trillion in ten years). 
 248  See Tankersley & Casselman, supra note 247 (“Polls show several of those ideas [of 
Democratic presidential hopefuls] are quite popular with the electorate, including taxing the 
assets of very wealthy Americans . . . But Democratic voters . . . worry that the popularity of 
the proposals will fade before next year’s general election and become a liability for their 
party’s nominee.”). 
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possibility of income tax reform.  In the past, the income tax rate has been 
as high as ninety-four percent.249  Because it may not be politically feasible 
to return income tax rates to such a high level,250 some critics of wealth 
inequality have suggested revising the existing income tax rules so as to 
treat gifts, bequests, and devises as income to the beneficiary.251  Adopting 
this rule would mean abandoning the step-up in basis rule under Section 
1014 (which provides that the donee takes a basis in the property equal to 
the fair market value of the property as of the decedent’s date of death or as 
of the alternate valuation date) and the implementing a carry-over basis 
regime under Section 1015 (which provides that the donee takes the 
donor’s basis).252  The country’s two prior experiments with carry-over 
basis were unsuccessful, but that does not mean that an updated version of 
a similar proposal should be off-limits.253  There have been many 
 
 249  See U.S. Federal Individual Income Tax Rates History, 1862-2013 (Nominal and 
Inflation-Adjusted Brackets), TAX FOUND. (Oct. 17, 2013), http://taxfoundation.org/article/ 
us-federal-individual-income-tax-rates-history-1913-2013-nominal-and-inflation-adjusted-
brackets (showing rate of 94% in 1945 and above 90% from 1946 until 1963).  See also 
Tracey M. Roberts, Brackets: A Historical Perspective, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 925 (2014) 
(surveying graduated income tax rate structure from 1913 to 2013). 
 250  In January 2019, Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) proposed a 
highest marginal tax rate of 70% applicable to those earning $10 million or more.  See, e.g., 
Howard Gleckman, About Rep. Ocasio-Cortez’s 70 Percent Tax Rates, TAX POL’Y CTR. 
(Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/about-rep-ocasio-cortezs-70-percent-
tax-rates (explaining that Representative Ocasio-Cortez proposed a marginal—not 
average—tax rate of seventy percent).  A poll shows that approximately 59% of all 
registered voters support the proposal, including 60% of Republicans and 71% of 
Democrats.  See, e.g., Steve Goldstein, Poll Finds Broad Support for Occasion Cortez’s 
70% Top-Tax-Rate Proposal, MARKETWATCH (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.marketwatch.co 
m/story/poll-finds-broad-support-for-ocasio-cortezs-70-top-tax-rate-proposal-2019-01-15.  
The proposal may be rhetorically appealing but it is not likely comprehensive enough for 
some Democrats.  See, e.g., Monica Prasad, Actually, It Was Democrats Who Killed the 70 
Percent Tax, POLITICO (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2019/02/05/ 
democrats-70-percent-tax-rate-000879 (“Pushing the capital gains tax modestly upward 
might not have the same emotional appeal to progressives as raising the top tax rate to a 
theatrical number like 70 percent, but it is critical to generating revenue.”).  Some 
Republicans have simply misinterpreted the proposal.  See, e.g., Gleckman, supra. 
 251  This is something that Professor Joseph Dodge, for one, has been advocating for over 
forty years.  See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including 
Gifts and Bequests in Income, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1177 (1978). 
 252  26 U.S.C.A. §§ 1014, 1015 (West 2018).  See generally Karen C. Burke & Grayson 
M.P. McCouch, Estate Tax Repeal: Through the Looking Glass, 22 VA. TAX. REV. 187 
(2002) (explaining carryover basis system’s operation and challenges). 
 253  See, e.g., Marc S. Bekerman & William P. LaPiana, Carryover Have We Features, 
19 PROB. & PROP. 38 (2005) (describing first proposed carryover basis law in 1976 as “so 
unsuccessful that it was repealed retroactively shortly after passage”); Grayson M.P. 
McCouch, The Empty Promise of Estate Tax Repeal, 28 VA. TAX REV. 369, 383 (2008) 
(critiquing carryover basis because it “inherently allows taxpayers who inherit appreciated 
property to defer paying tax on the unrealized gain until they sell the property.  In this 
context, deferral is equivalent to a reduction in the rate of tax on capital gains; the longer the 
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thoughtful scholarly proposals to address wealth inequality through income 
tax reform.254  Such reform in fact might be able to accomplish a reduction 
in the wealth gap.  The complexities of income tax reform are beyond the 
scope of this Article, however.255  Instead, the next Part considers a new 
possible focus for concerns about wealth inequality: revisions to the 
substantive law of trusts. 
VI. TRUSTS IN A MAGICAL WORLD 
Courts lack the institutional capacity to meaningfully change state 
income tax laws or substantive state laws governing trusts.256  The federal 
estate tax system is not especially effective in its current form, and it is not 
obvious that there is political will to transform it.257  There are thoughtful 
ways that the federal income tax system could more effectively treat 
accessions to personal wealth.258  What has received less attention is how 
the law of trusts could be changed with the explicit goal of reducing wealth 
inequality.  A careful unpacking of the critiques of the Kaestner Trust case 
in particular, as well as family trusts in general,259 prompts the question of 
whether limiting the use of trusts—or even eliminating them altogether—
might be one way to address the wealth gap.  This Part briefly (and 
reluctantly) brackets tax reform out of the analysis to imagine a new legal 
landscape for trusts.260 
First, envision a system in which the only allowable trusts were for 
those who lack the legal capacity to manage money for themselves.  This 
would limit the universe of trust beneficiaries largely to minors and those 
who have been declared legally incompetent.  If a senior generation family 
member wants to transfer assets to a younger generation family member 
who has the legal capacity to own assets, but the intended donee lacks 
financial savvy, the younger family member will have to hire someone to 
manage the assets.  In this iteration of an altered trust landscape, there 
 
deferral period, the lower the effective tax rate.”). 
 254  Other law professors have advanced well-reasoned proposals for estate tax reform.  
See, e.g., Miranda Perry Fleischer, Divide and Conquer: Using an Accessions Tax to 
Combat Dynastic Wealth Transfers, 57 B.C. L. REV. 913 (2016); Joseph M. Dodge, 
Replacing the Estate Tax with a Reimagined Accessions Tax, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 997 (2009). 
 255  For a powerful argument in favor of a focus in income tax reform to address wealth 
inequality, see, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Distracted from Distraction by Distraction: 
Reimagining Estate Tax Reform, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1235, 1253 (2013) (arguing for 
abandoning the estate tax in favor of “a consistent progressive consumption, or equivalently, 
a cash-flow spending tax”). 
 256  See supra Part V.A.  
 257  See supra Part V.B. 
 258  Id.  See also McCaffery, supra note 255. 
 259  See supra Part IV. 
 260  See supra note 255 and accompanying text. 
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could be no special needs trusts for beneficiaries with disabilities, as long 
as they have the technical legal capacity to hold property.  A parent 
therefore would have to choose between disinheriting an adult child who is 
physically disabled, but has full mental capacity, or leaving assets outright 
to the adult child, for example.  If the parent does the latter, the adult child 
initially would not be eligible for governmental benefits to assist with 
needs arising from the disability.  The adult child would have to consume 
all of the parent’s bequest first. 
A second feature of an alternate trust universe could be a limitation on 
the duration of any trust to the lifetime of a named individual who is alive 
at the time of the trust creation.  Upon that individual’s death, the assets 
could vest in say, a particular beneficiary’s estate, or pass outright to 
someone else entirely.  Some dead hand control would be tolerated, but for 
only one lifetime.  There would be zero possibility that assets could pass 
tax free successively down the generations. 
A third option, to be deployed alone or in connection with other 
features, could be eliminating spendthrift clauses.261  A beneficiary would 
have no protection, then, against voluntary or involuntary creditors.  
Presumably, this would encourage responsible and prudent behavior by the 
beneficiary, but even the most morally faultless beneficiary could not 
shield assets if legally responsible for causing harm to another.  In this 
world, beneficiaries with drug addictions or imprudent spending habits 
would soon be parted from their funds. 
A fourth possibility in the imagined new trust world could be to 
permit family trusts, but to limit the amount of money that can be held in 
all trusts for any beneficiary, akin to the cap on funds that can be held for 
one individual in college tuition savings programs, also known as “529 
plans.”262  Every time a grantor creates a trust, the trust would have to 
register with the state or federal government, and the trustee would be 
required to make annual reports of the assets under management.  The 
government would confiscate any amounts over the financial limit.  The 
limit could be set at, say, the individual wealth transfer tax exemption of 
$11.4 million (in 2019).263  A drawback to this feature, however, is it could 
 
 261  This approach would be more consistent with English law, which generally does not 
recognize spendthrift trusts.  See Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of 
Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1198–99 (1985). 
 262  The limits depend on the particulars of the state that sponsors the plan.  See, e.g., 
Kathryn Flynn, How Much Can You Contribute to a 529 Plan in 2019?, SAVING FOR 
COLLEGE (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.savingforcollege.com/article/how-much-can-you-
contribute-to-a-529-plan (“Limits vary by state, ranging from $235,000 to $529,000. This 
amount represents what the state believes to be the full cost of attending an expensive 
school and graduate school, including textbooks and room and board.”). 
 263  See supra note 236 (announcing individual wealth transfer tax exemption, indexed 
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have the unintended consequence of causing trustees to invest in an overly 
conservative manner, something that twentieth-century trust reformers 
recognized as a long-standing problem and then largely addressed by the 
Uniform Prudent Investor Act.264  The Uniform Act explicitly permits the 
trustee to make any investment a prudent investor would “by considering 
the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other circumstances of 
the trust,” without fear that an under-performing asset will cause the trustee 
to be deemed to have breached the trustee’s fiduciary duty.265  If a trustee 
of a wealth-capped family trust knew that having “too successful” 
investments could trigger a financial penalty, the trustee might be 
encouraged to invest in assets with minimal growth potential.  As an 
economic matter, having an entire class of property owners who are not 
free in practice to invest in growth assets likely would skew the market 
inappropriately.  This is hardly a desirable result. 
A fifth option, again to be used alone or in conjunction with other 
proposals, could be to disallow all self-settled asset protection trusts.  
Those U.S. domiciliaries who want to shield their assets from creditors 
likely would simply establish a self-settled trust in the Cayman Islands, for 
example, and make the money much more difficult for any voluntary or 
involuntary creditor to reach, or for any criminal investigator to discover.266  
This would have negative consequences for U.S. resident banks and trust 
companies that presently maintain such trusts in one of the fifty states (and 
the workforces that support the administration of those trusts). 
A sixth possible option could be to require that all trustees be banks or 
trust companies with no prior relationship with the grantor or any of the 
beneficiaries.  The grantor would be unable to choose a trusted family 
 
for inflation). 
 264  See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1994) (“A trustee 
shall invest and manage trust assets as a prudent investor would, by considering the 
purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other circumstances of the trust. In satisfying 
this standard, the trustee shall exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution.”).  But cf.  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (AM. LAW INST. 2007) (under section entitled 
“General Standard of Prudent Investment,” requiring trustee to invest trust property “as a 
prudent investor would”).  Forty-three states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands have adopted the Uniform Prudent Investor Act.  See Unif. Prudent Investor Act, 
UNIF. L. COMMISSION, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?Commu 
nityKey=58f87d0a-3617-4635-a2af-9a4d02d119c9 (last visited Oct. 15, 2019) (listing 
jurisdictions that have adopted the law).  For a discussion of the Uniform Prudent Investor 
Act and its basis in modern portfolio theory, see, e.g., Steward E. Sterk, Rethinking Trust 
Law Reform: How Prudent is Modern Prudent Investor Doctrine? 95 CORNELL L. REV. 851 
(2010). 
 265  See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1994).  
 266  See, e.g., James M. Duggan, The Prudence of Offshore Planning for Affluent Clients, 
40 EST. PLAN. 18 (2013) (describing jurisdictional obstacles to reaching assets in a trust 
established in a jurisdiction such as Jersey, Bermuda, and the Cayman Islands). 
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friend or advisor as trustee.  With an institutional “stranger” as trustee, 
outside observers would have more confidence that the split of legal and 
equitable title represents a meaningful separation of the beneficiary from 
the trust property.  There could be a further requirement that the only 
institutions eligible to act as trustee are those located in jurisdictions that 
are certain to tax on the basis of the trustee’s conduct of business in that 
jurisdiction.  In this scenario, one might see a “race to the top,” a 
jurisdictional competition to implement an income tax in states that do not 
have one, so that institutions in that jurisdiction could be eligible to serve 
as trustees of family trusts.267  But if private individuals were prohibited 
from acting as trustees, institutions might raise their fiduciary fees, 
knowing that the grantor must select one of them.  Some would say that 
this is a small price to pay, and one paid by people who can afford it 
anyway, for increased public confidence in the integrity of family trusts. 
A seventh option could be to eliminate all family trusts.  A transfer for 
a minor beneficiary would have to be made via the Uniform Gifts to 
Minors Act, Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, or a formal guardianship.268  
Disabled, drug addicted, improvident, or tortfeasing beneficiaries 
(intentional or accidental) would be left to their own devices to manage 
their assets, hire someone to do so, and—along with donees of family 
assets who experience divorce—lose some or all of their money.  
Advantages of a no-trust legal landscape would be the absence of doubt 
about who pays tax on any income from the assets.  As the outright owner, 
the beneficiary would be liable for the income tax.  And if at the time of the 
gift, the beneficiary lived in a state with no income tax, the beneficiary 
could be required to move to a jurisdiction that does impose a tax, as a 
condition of taking ownership of the gift.  If the beneficiary declined to do 
so, the property would escheat to the state.  Or, instead of requiring the 
beneficiary to change domiciles, the property could continue to be taxed to 
the transferor (assuming the transferor resided in a jurisdiction with an 
income tax).  If neither the transferor nor the donee were subject to income 
tax, the beneficiary could be required to calculate a tentative annual state 
income tax equivalent, at the highest rate imposed by any state, and to pay 
that amount to a collective fund devoted to assistance of the poor (without 
receiving any income tax charitable contribution deduction for doing so).  
 
 267  Cf. Sterk, supra note 215 (calling repeal of rule against perpetuities a “race to the 
bottom”). 
 268  See, e.g., Cornelius W. Coghill III & Mark B. Edwards, Transfers to Minors: Basic 
Techniques, 4 PROB. & PROP. 20 (1990) (explaining different vehicles typically used for 
transferring property to minors, and recommending transfers under the Uniform Gifts to 
Minors Act or the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, but discouraging the use of a court-
appointed guardian because of restrictions on investments by the guardian, among other 
reasons). 
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Such a proposal likely would be met with widespread disapproval, as it 
infringes on personal liberty (i.e., a personal decision about where to live).  
It is probably unconstitutional as well.  But if critics want to eliminate all 
state tax arbitrage loopholes, some sort of universal state income tax or its 
equivalent would be a necessary feature of a no-trust landscape (however 
unwelcome by those who live in states that impose no income tax). 
There are multiple problems with each of these specific options for a 
drastically different legal landscape for trusts, and no doubt, there are 
countless other ways to reform substantive trust law—separate and apart 
from the tax law—and those would have drawbacks, too.  The seven 
suggestions in this Part are unworkable for many reasons, but each does in 
fact address one or more concerns raised by critics of family trusts.  To be 
sure, these suggestions are an exercise in magical thinking, just as trusts 
themselves are the product of magical thinking.  So, too, is the hope that 
courts will play an active role in dismantling wealth inequality, because 
courts are not free, on their own initiative, to disregard hundreds of years of 
law that treats trusts as valid property arrangements and the tax laws that 
have developed to address trusts.269  But by contemplating unrealistic and 
even undesirable changes to trust law, family trusts’ salutary functions may 
become clearer. 
If the reaction to the seven suggestions is that an alternate legal 
landscape with limited (or no) trusts is unfathomable, that reaction can help 
pinpoint the contexts in which a critic might tolerate or even encourage 
family trusts, notwithstanding the large national wealth gap.  Similarly, if 
particular limitations or modifications appeal or seem reasonable in some 
way, critics of family trusts will be better able to focus on specific 
objectionable trust features, without condemning all family trusts.  
Dialogue about dialogue might sharpen future dialogue.  This may be too 
precious a claim.  But perhaps not. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The development of trust law intertwines with tax-minimization (and 
even tax-avoidance) strategies.270  That is a matter of historical fact.271  It is 
equally true that trusts are effective management devices to hold property 
for the benefit of those whom the grantor has decided, for whatever reason, 
 
 269  See Crawford, supra note 13 and accompanying text; Spivak, supra note 152 and 
accompanying text. 
 270  See, e.g., F.W. Maitland, The Origin of Uses, 8 HARV. L. REV. 127, 130 (1894) 
(describing thirteenth-century English laws that prevented Franciscan monks from owning 
property that gave rise to a wealthy benefactor’s establishment of a use for the benefit of the 
order). 
 271  Id. 
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should not own the property outright.272  Common reasons might include 
the legal incapacity of the beneficiary (for example, because of age, mental 
incapacity, or even sex—proxy for legal incapacity, historically 
speaking).273  For hundreds of years, courts and legislators have treated as 
entirely valid and legally enforceable the magical thinking that a grantor 
splits legal and equitable title by making a transfer to a trustee for the 
benefit of one or more beneficiaries. 
Theoretically speaking, the law’s respect for trusts is based on the idea 
that if a grantor has no obligation to transfer any proverbial bundle of 
property-right sticks to a beneficiary, then it is perfectly within the 
grantor’s discretion to transfer to the beneficiary less than the entire bundle 
of sticks.274  Clever lawyers have developed multiple ways to whittle any 
individual stick in that bundle—prohibiting a beneficiary’s creditors from 
reaching the trust assets, revising state laws so that trusts can last forever, 
and permitting trustees to move assets from one trust to another, for 
example. 
In the twenty-first century, family trusts frequently contain multiple 
clauses that seem designed primarily to protect and preserve eye-popping 
levels of wealth.  That makes it easy to lose sight of the fact that family 
trusts are not per se problematic.  Trusts can serve valuable management 
functions—such as in the case of trusts for minors or disabled beneficiaries; 
or for jointly held or specialized assets—and even appropriately separate a 
beneficiary from outright ownership of assets so that a beneficiary will not 
become a drain on public resources.  So, too, the ability to decant trust 
assets into a new trust may facilitate correction of harmless errors in trust 
 
 272  Consider again, for example, the infamous Duke of Norfolk’s Case, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 
(Ch.). 
 273  Before the enactment of certain law reforms in the nineteenth century, married 
women, for example, could hold property only through separate estate trusts.  See, e.g., 
Allison Anna Tait, The Beginning of the End of Coverture: A Reappraisal of the Married 
Woman’s Separate Estate, 26 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 165, 167 (2014) (“Although little-
known in modern legal circles, the separate estate was, by and large, the sole form of 
married women’s property before statutory enactments granted married women property 
rights in the nineteenth century.  In its most basic form, a separate estate was any assets put 
in trust for a woman, such that it was for her “sole and separate use” and not available to her 
husband or his creditors.”). 
 274  During the early nineteenth century, most U.S. jurisdictions did not recognize 
restraints on alienation of beneficial trust interests.  See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 261, at 
1198–99 (1985) (describing development of U.S. jurisprudence).  Nevertheless, American 
jurisprudence developed in a direction that resulted in the recognition of spendthrift trusts.  
See, e.g., Nicholas v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 727 (1875) (expressing in dicta approval for 
testator’s wishes “to use his own property in securing the object of his affection, as far as 
property can do it, from the ills of life, the vicissitudes of fortune, and even his own 
improvidence, or incapacity for self-protection, should not be permitted to do so, is not 
readily perceived”); Broadway Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170 (1882) (upholding 
spendthrift provision of trust). 
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instruments or allow a trustee to relocate a trust to a jurisdiction with more 
flexible administrative rules, or allowing a trust to last without a specific 
termination date might protect against future beneficiaries’ strategic 
behavior or improvidence.  But loading trust instruments with so many 
provisions that large numbers of ultrawealthy families are almost certain to 
stay that way permanently may tip the balance of “traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice”275 too far in favor of private inurement. 
Unless one is willing to abolish trusts entirely (which is both 
impractical and unwise), one must engage in a difficult line-drawing 
project.  It may be possible to achieve quick consensus that sham trusts are 
“bad” and that trusts for minors or legally incapacitated people are “good,” 
but a vast area lies between the two poles.  Engaging in a sincere dialogue 
about cases like Kaestner Trust invites interrogation of the role that trusts 
play in creating and sustaining inequality.  These conversations might 
facilitate identification of allies—whether of the “top down” variety, like 
members of the American Law Institute or the Uniform Law Commission, 
or the “bottom up” kind like local lawyers and bankers276—who appreciate 
that wealth inequality is not good for the long-term stability of society.277  
Trust law reform can (and should be) made on a state-law level.  Our 
collective future depends on reducing the wealth gap among all segments 
of society. 
 
 
 275  See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 276  See supra note 230. 
 277  See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text. 
